Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 105 | Issue 1

Article 4

Winter 2015

Criminals Get All the Rights: The Sociolegal
Construction of Different Rights to Die
Meredith Martin Rountree

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Meredith Martin Rountree, Criminals Get All the Rights: The Sociolegal Construction of Different Rights to Die, 105 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology (2015).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol105/iss1/4

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/15/10501-0149
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2016 by Northwestern University School of Law

Vol. 105, No. 1
Printed in U.S.A.

CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS:
THE SOCIOLEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
DIFFERENT RIGHTS TO DIE
MEREDITH MARTIN ROUNTREE*

In the United States, different people have different rights to die. This
Article traces the origins of death-sentenced prisoners’ ability to enlist
assistance in dying and compares it to the considerably more circumscribed
right held by people with serious illness. It uses empirical research on
“volunteers,” death-sentenced prisoners who sought execution, to argue
that the legal standard for adjudicating their requests to hasten execution
should be changed. Empirical evidence suggests many of the concerns
governing the regulation of assisted dying in the medical context are
present in the death row case. This Article therefore urges courts to use a
balancing test comparable to that developed in cases involving assisted
dying in the medical context. Further, counsel should be appointed to
articulate the state’s interests in subjecting the conviction and sentence to
appellate review.
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INTRODUCTION
With the ink scarcely dry on the Supreme Court’s decision reviving
capital punishment in the United States,1 Gary Gilmore burst onto the legal
scene. Gilmore demanded his execution, all but daring the State of Utah to
kill him. In response to opponents of his execution, Gary Gilmore
complained:
You know, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that you have a right to die. I’m talking
about the Karen Ann Quinlan case. I don’t even really think that enters, if I want to
press for my civil rights. I could raise issues like that, but I’m not.2

Since Gary Gilmore’s 1976 execution, over 10% of death-sentenced
prisoners executed in the United States hastened their own executions.3 This
Article examines Gilmore’s (and others’) contention that these prisoners
have a “right” to die, as well as the sociolegal context in which rights to
hasten death are embedded. Comparing the rights to die of the terminally ill
and the death-sentenced reveals how historical contingencies, normative
1

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
The New Jersey Supreme Court, not the United States Supreme Court, decided the
Quinlan case in March 1976. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). Gilmore’s reference
to this case in November 1976, however, reflects its cultural currency at the time he sought
to be executed. Transcript of November 30, 1976 Utah Board of Pardons Hearing at 12, In re
Gilmore, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (on file with author).
3
The Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) reports 1,389 executions in the modern
era and identifies 142 “volunteers,” defined as those prisoners who waive available legal
appeals. Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (last visited Sept. 19, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/CC4P-5TG8; http://perma.cc/5BG6-ACG7. It excludes, therefore, prisoners who
pursue legal remedies, but do not seek clemency. It also excludes those prisoners who
abandoned their appeals at one point, but then changed their minds, regardless of whether the
courts permitted them to resume their appeals. Margaret Vandiver et al., “Let’s Do It!”: An
Analysis of Consensual Executions, in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 190 (Robert M. Bohm
ed., 2008). The Winter 2014 edition of Death Row U.S.A., compiled by the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. reported that of the 1,359 individuals executed in the
modern era, 143 were volunteers, or 10.5%. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC.,
DEATH ROW U.S.A. WINTER 2014, at 10 (2014), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/
publications/DRUSA_Winter_2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UEN5-JZBB. For a
discussion of the word “volunteer,” see infra subpart III(B)(3).
2
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beliefs, and different legal logics can shape legal responses to demands for
rights. In this case, the death row prisoner is legally privileged as compared
to the terminally ill patient. Paradoxically, however, the more expansive
right held by the death row prisoner reflects and furthers his social
marginalization.
Prior scholarship on so-called volunteers has generally taken one of
two approaches.4 One strand focuses on reforming the legal standards
governing volunteers. Anthony Casey, as discussed below, argued for
different standards for waiving appeals depending on the appeal sought to
be waived.5 John Blume proposed a framework for adjudication that would
assess possible suicidal motivation and prohibit “unjust” punishments, such
as the execution of the innocent or those who are categorically excluded
from the death penalty.6 This scholarship retains the essential conceptual
model of the criminal law of waiver and the Eighth Amendment death
penalty framework of heightened reliability. Another thread of scholarship
has argued for a right to execution, analogizing the death row prisoner
seeking execution to the terminally ill.7 As explored in greater detail below,
this latter work has relied on assumptions about the volunteer population
and how capital law works to argue for a categorical right to execution,

4
G. Richard Strafer’s article, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness
and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983),
represents an exception. His qualified Fourteenth Amendment analysis, however, is not
informed by more recent legal and empirical developments.
5
Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a
Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30
AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 101–05 (2002).
6
John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 939, 967–72 (2005).
7
See, e.g., Kristen M. Dama, Comment, Redefining a Final Act: The Fourteenth
Amendment and States’ Obligation to Prevent Death Row Inmates from Volunteering to Be
Put to Death, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1083, 1101 (2007) (arguing states have no constitutional
obligation to prevent volunteering for execution); Kathleen L. Johnson, Note, The Death
Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 614–21, 623
(1981) (asserting that the state’s interests in preserving life, protecting innocent third parties,
prevention of suicide, and maintaining professional ethics were categorically outweighed by
prisoner’s fundamental “right to freedom of choice”; therefore “the state’s interest in
preserving respect for life through careful appellate review of all death sentences should give
way to the competent prisoner’s right to refuse appeal” so long as the waiver is competently
made); Julie Levinsohn Milner, Note, Dignity or Death Row: Are Death Row Rights to Die
Diminished? A Comparison of the Right to Die for the Terminally Ill and the Terminally
Sentenced, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279, 336 (1998) (“[T]he death
row right to die should exist for those inmates for whom a right to die via refusal of lifesustaining medical treatment would exist if they were terminally ill rather than terminally
sentenced” so long as prisoner is competent and waives his rights).
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rather than one that should be subjected to careful, individualized weighing
of interests.
This Article supplies a much-needed empirical basis for a critique of
the waiver model as inadequate and the unqualified Fourteenth Amendment
right to die as inappropriate. The legal standard for waivers is low and
problematic, as discussed below. Further, the Fourteenth Amendment right
to die framework, which balances the state’s interests in the preservation of
life, prevention of suicide, protection of third parties, and protection of the
integrity of the medical profession against the individual’s interest in
autonomy in dying, is relevant to the death row prisoner. Based on recent
research on the death row population generally and volunteers specifically,
I propose a standard for death row volunteers that borrows from the medical
context by requiring the volunteer to persuade the court that his right to die
outweighs the state’s interests.
The death row data support the analytic “fit” of the Fourteenth
Amendment model. Mental health researchers have found a greater
prevalence of psychological and psychiatric disorders on death row
generally, and my research suggests that volunteers may be at greater risk
for suicide. Many, if not most, death row prisoners (including volunteers)
have ties to third parties. My research also highlights the inability of the
waiver model to protect the integrity of the legal profession and the legal
system broadly conceived. Bypassing appeals raises concerns about the
reliability of the capital punishment system. In addition, observations of
attorney performance reveal the professional and ethical tensions attorneys
confront as they represent volunteering clients.
This Article also goes beyond previous work by tracing the sociolegal
context in which different rights to die emerged. By contrasting Gary
Gilmore and Karen Ann Quinlan, historical contemporaries and landmark
figures in defining modern American rights to die, this Article illuminates
not only the contradictory ways the law treats the asserted right, but also the
profoundly different historical and social settings in which these rights
claims emerged. This Article then urges courts to refocus on the
fundamental question: when can an individual legally obtain assistance in
dying? In answering that question for death-sentenced prisoners, courts
should consider the broader social values that they have traditionally
weighed in adjudicating requests to hasten death in the medical context.
Part I of this Article sets out the different legal frameworks for
adjudicating requests to hasten death among the death-sentenced and the
sick. Part II describes empirical findings that should inform the central legal
questions. Part III discusses the historical and cultural context in which the
law took shape. Part IV proposes an improved legal process that
incorporates the state’s interests in decisions to hasten death in the medical
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context into adjudications of death row prisoners’ requests to hasten
execution. It would also mandate that counsel be appointed to advance the
state’s interests in opposing the prisoner’s waiver of further appeals. In its
Conclusion, this Article reflects on some of the larger questions raised by
this project, including the apparent paradox that the socially powerless
death row prisoner has a right to assistance in dying where the innocent and
ill do not. In addition, the death row research reveals the precarity and
ambiguity of certain legal constructs, such as “voluntary” and “rational,”
which are central to defining a right to die.
I. DIFFERENT RIGHTS TO DIE8
Death-sentenced prisoners vindicate a right to die through a technical
legal process that, when contrasted with the process used by those with
serious physical illness, reflects how differently these groups are treated.
Courts understand that seriously ill people are embedded in a larger social
world and recognize that their cases present profound questions about death
and dying. By contrast, for the volunteer, even the most salient concern
about the legitimacy of a state execution recedes as the court focuses on the
narrower issues of whether the prisoner is competent to waive his rights to
appeal and does so knowingly, intelligently, and competently.
After outlining the death row volunteer’s legal process, this Part
describes the evolution of rights to die in the medical context. As discussed
in greater detail below, patients achieved the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical intervention in most instances, but a right to assistance in dying
was rejected by the Supreme Court. Certain states responded by authorizing
assistance in dying under certain very limited circumstances. The Part
concludes by analogizing the death row volunteer to patients who seek
assistance in dying.
A. DEATH-SENTENCED PRISONERS

1. Process for Hastening Execution
A death-sentenced prisoner can hasten execution by abandoning his9
appeals, usually by discharging counsel and electing not to file any
8
Versions of the description of the legal regime governing death row waivers have
previously appeared in Meredith Martin Rountree, “I’ll Make Them Shoot Me”: Accounts of
Death-Sentenced Prisoners Advocating for Execution, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 589 (2012)
[hereinafter “Accounts”] and Meredith Martin Rountree, Volunteers for Execution:
Directions for Further Research into Grief, Culpability, and Legal Structures, 82 UMKC L.
REV. 295 (2014) [hereinafter “Directions for Research”].
9
While women have been subjected to the death penalty, they constitute only a fraction
of death row inmates. As of January 1, 2014, sixty women are on death row in the United

2015]

CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS

155

pleadings on his own behalf. Prisoners typically have three essentially
sequential avenues of appeals.
The first appeal is called a “direct appeal,” in which the prisoner
generally argues to the state’s highest criminal court that the trial judge
made erroneous legal rulings in the course of the trial. The degree to which
capital cases are routinely subjected to appellate review may be overstated
because of the prevalence of statutory provisions characterizing the direct
appeal as “automatic.”10 The availability of the appellate mechanism does
not necessarily mean that the direct review cannot be waived. A few states
prohibit waiver of direct review in capital cases,11 but others permit deathsentenced prisoners to forgo direct appeal at least in part. These states may
permit the death-sentenced prisoner to waive his “personal” right to
appeal12 but still require, e.g., a review dictated by statute. Therefore,
Washington State requires its Supreme Court to consider whether “there are
not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency”; whether “the
sentence . . . is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases”; and whether “the sentence . . . was brought about through
passion or prejudice.”13 Texas ostensibly requires a direct appeal, but since
States. Thirteen have been executed. By contrast, at last count, 3,010 men are currently on
death row, and 1,346 have been executed. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra
note 3, at 1, 8. The Death Penalty Information Center reports that 139 death-sentenced men
and 3 women successfully sought execution. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 3. For
simplicity, I use the masculine pronoun throughout this Article.
10
See Johnson, supra note 7, at 578; Milner, supra note 7, at 284–85.
11
See, e.g., State v. Ovante, 291 P.3d 974, 978 (Ariz. 2013) (en banc); State v. Brewer,
826 P.2d 783, 790–91 (Ariz. 1992); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 39–41 (Cal. 1998);
Robertson v. State, 143 So. 3d 907, 908–09 (Fla. 2014); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383
A.2d 174, 180–81 (Pa. 1978).
12
Newman v. State, 84 S.W.3d 443, 444 (Ark. 2002).
13
State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86, 97–98 (Wash. 1992); see also Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d
1368, 1375 (Del. 1992) (finding complete waiver precluded by state statutory mandate);
Geary v. State, 977 P.2d 344, 346–47 (Nev. 1999) (“Despite Geary’s valid waiver of his
appeal, this court must conduct a mandatory review pursuant to . . . [a statute requiring] this
court to review whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances, whether the
death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary
factor, and whether the death sentence is excessive, considering the crime and the
defendant.”); Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 808 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (“The sentence
review, which we have found to be mandatory and not subject to waiver, requires this Court
to determine whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances found by the trial
judge.”); State v. Motts, 707 S.E.2d 804, 811 (S.C. 2011) (“Although Motts is entitled to
waive his personal right to a direct appeal, we hold that he cannot waive this Court’s
statutorily-imposed duty to review his capital sentence.”); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 551
S.E.2d 332, 333 (Va. 2001) (“Although Patterson has waived his right of appeal, Code §
17.1-313 mandates that we review the imposition of the death sentence. We must consider
and determine whether the sentence of death was imposed ‘under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor,’ and whether the sentence is ‘excessive or
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1994, in cases where the volunteer waives direct appeal and discharges
counsel, the appellate court has proceeded without the benefit of briefing in
determining whether “fundamental error” marred the trial.14
The second appeal—variously called a “collateral attack,”
“postconviction appeal,” or “state habeas proceeding”—provides the
prisoner an opportunity to argue to the state court that he was deprived of a
fair trial, not because the trial judge made a legal error, but because of
events outside the courtroom. These claims typically include evidence of
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial suppression of material
exculpatory evidence. When it had the death penalty, only New Jersey
prevented prisoners from waiving postconviction appeals in capital cases.15
The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the public’s “interest in the
reliability and integrity of a death sentencing decision . . . transcend[ed] the
preferences of individual defendants.”16
The final avenue of appeal essentially combines all federal
constitutional claims raised on direct appeal and in state habeas
proceedings. These claims are presented to the federal district court in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus.17 An adverse adjudication by the federal
district court may, under certain circumstances, be appealed to the federal

disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant.’”). Louisiana requires the appellate court to consider whether the death sentence
is “excessive” because of a state constitutional provision. State v. Bordelon, 2007-KA-0525,
p.4 (La. 10/16/09); 33 So. 3d 842, 847. “Excessiveness” is decided based on the influence of
“arbitrary factors,” and “whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of at least one
aggravating circumstance.” Id. at p.11, 33 So. 3d at 850–51. This “safeguard[s] a defendant’s
right not to suffer cruel and unusual punishment, and . . . protect[s] society’s fundamental
interest in ensuring that the coercive power of the State is not employed in a manner that
shocks the community’s conscience or undermines the integrity of our criminal justice
system.” Id. at p.11, 33 So. 3d at 851 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Georgia has
what appears to be an unusual system in which the Court not only must review the sentence
as set out in the relevant statute, but also has the ability to require issues to be briefed.
Colwell v. State, 543 S.E.2d 682, 682 (Ga. 2001) (“[I]n a death penalty case . . . the statutory
basis for appellate review requires mandatory review. In addition, the Unified Appeal
Procedure requires this Court to review a death penalty case, whether or not the defendant
files a notice of appeal, and authorizes this Court to direct the defendant’s appellate counsel
and the State’s attorney to brief and argue grounds not raised on appeal.” (internal citations
omitted)).
14
Discussed infra subpart II(E).
15
See Pike v. State, 164 S.W.3d 257, 265 (Tenn. 2005) (listing opinions permitting
waiver of postconviction review in capital cases). New Jersey abolished the death penalty in
2007. Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/8WFW-U4QN.
16
State v. Martini, 677 A.2d 1106, 1107 (N.J. 1996).
17
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).

2015]

CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS

157

appellate court.18 The Ninth Circuit suggested at one point that its interest in
ensuring the just administration of the death penalty could permit a federal
court to reject a prisoner’s effort to waive appeals,19 but it subsequently
stepped away from that position.20 Generally, the federal courts simply
focus on whether a prisoner has met the legal criteria for waiver, as outlined
below.21
2. Legal Criteria for Hastening Execution
Courts evaluate decisions to abandon appeals according to four
criteria: the prisoner must make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver of his rights to appeal, and he must be mentally competent.22 These
criteria are commonly applied in other parts of the criminal justice system.
In accepting a guilty plea, for example, the court engages in a (usually
stock) colloquy with the defendant designed to elicit his agreement that he,
having been advised by counsel, understands the consequences of his plea,
including that he abandons certain constitutional rights when he pleads
guilty (the “knowing and intelligent” waiver), and that he has not been
coerced into giving up these rights (the “voluntariness” requirement).23
Because the requirements for waiver are so low, the competency
determination is the crux of the legal life of the volunteer.24 Generally, if the
18

Id. § 2253 (2012).
Comer v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 950 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc granted sub nom,
Comer v. Stewart, 471 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 2006), aff. sub nom, Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d
960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“To allow a defendant to choose his own sentence introduces
unconscionable arbitrariness into the capital punishment system.”).
20
Comer, 480 F.3d at 964 (“If Comer is competent to waive further proceedings, then
we need not, and indeed cannot, decide whether any of Comer’s claims have merit or are
procedurally barred because there is no dispute remaining between the parties.”).
21
See, e.g., Simpson v. Quarterman, 341 F. App’x 68, 69 (5th Cir. 2009); Dennis ex rel.
Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2004); Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 617–24 (11th
Cir. 1999); Harper v. Parker, 177 F.3d 567, 573 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Zettlemoyer, 53 F.3d
24, 29 (3d Cir. 1995); Smith ex rel. Mo. Public Defender Comm’n v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d
1050, 1056–59 (8th Cir. 1987); Lopez v. Stephens, No. 2:12-CV-160, 2014 WL 2981056, at
*7–11 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2014); White v. Horn, 54 F. Supp. 2d 457, 467–70 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
22
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993) (knowing, voluntary, intelligent, and
competent); Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (defining competency).
23
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748–49, 756 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
24
A few courts have suggested that conditions of incarceration could make a waiver
involuntary. See, e.g., Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2000); Smith, 812 F.2d
at 1050. In Groseclose ex rel. Harries v. Dutton, 594 F. Supp. 949, 961 (M.D. Tenn. 1984),
the court granted next friend standing based on prison conditions’ effect on voluntariness,
and, in Tabler v. Stephens, the district court
deemed [Tabler] mentally competent . . . , [but it] ruled that his waiver was not
voluntary. In October of 2008—more than one month after his original state court
19
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prisoner is found competent, he will be able to waive his rights and his
appeals. Only if the prisoner is found incompetent can others—such as
parents—move to intervene as a “next friend” to continue the appeals.25 In
the context of death-sentenced prisoners waiving appeals, courts generally
cite the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision Rees v. Peyton, which asked
whether the prisoner had the “capacity to appreciate his position and make a
rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or
on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or
defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”26
In Rumbaugh v. Procunier,27 the Fifth Circuit confronted a tension
inherent in this standard. Rumbaugh had a history of self-injury and suicide
attempts, including when he charged a court officer in the middle of his
competency hearing to provoke the officer shoot him.28 Mental health
professionals testified that Rumbaugh grasped the logical consequences of
his decision, but his decision to hasten his execution was substantially
affected by a mental disease, namely severe depression.29 The Fifth Circuit
then refined its interpretation of Rees by restricting the judicial
determination of competence to whether the prisoner’s decision was “the
product of a reasonable assessment of the legal and medical facts and a
competency hearing—Tabler made a threatening phone call to a state senator while on
death row. An inquiry into the call ultimately led to an investigation into cell phone
smuggling in the prison, which purportedly resulted in threats and harassment from
prison staff and fellow inmates. Whether or not Tabler’s perception matched reality,
the district court found that Tabler genuinely believed his family would be harmed if
he did not volunteer for execution and therefore found his attempt to waive his federal
habeas relief involuntary.
588 Fed. App’x. 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, No. 12-70013,
2015 WL 327646, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015).
25
Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149
(1990); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). The issues of surrogate decisionmaking in
death penalty cases and in cases involving the incompetent, severely ill person are quite
different. For the volunteer, the surrogate simply opts to continue the litigation. See, e.g., In
re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (“Accordingly, it is ORDERED that
[named attorney] be appointed ‘Next Friend’ of applicant, John Cockrum for the purposes of
pursuing the writ of habeas corpus before this court. As such, he shall act in the best interest
of the applicant in directing the habeas corpus proceedings before this court” and setting
briefing schedule for habeas litigation). In the context of medical intervention, courts try to
discern whether the surrogate is asking for what the patient would have wanted. ALAN
MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING (3rd ed. 2008) at 4-5–4-99. Because these issues are fundamentally so
different (unlike, I contend, the issues associated with putatively competent requests to
hasten one’s own death), I do not discuss them here.
26
Rees, 384 U.S. at 314.
27
753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985).
28
Id. at 397, 406.
29
Id. at 400–01, 406, 408–09.
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reasoned thought process.”30 That the “rational decision-making process”
took place within a severe depression was legally irrelevant. The depression
may well have “contribute[d] to his invitation of death,” but the law
required only that Rumbaugh be aware of his situation and his options in
deciding to waive further appeals.31 In other words, the court need only
“inquire about the discrete capacity to understand and make rational
decisions concerning the proceedings at issue, and the presence or absence
of mental illness or brain disorder is not dispositive.”32
After the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rumbaugh, the Supreme Court
considered the case of Godinez v. Moran,33 in which it had to decide
whether certain types of waivers required different types of mental
competencies. Similar to Rumbaugh, Moran had previously attempted
suicide, was experiencing “deep depression,” and took psychiatric
medication.34 Harmonious with Rumbaugh’s holding, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Constitution required only a single type of mental
competency, namely that the prisoner have “sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding”
and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.”35 The Moran dissenters protested: “[T]he majority upholds the death
sentence for a person whose decision to discharge counsel, plead guilty, and
present no defense well may have been the product of medication or mental
illness.”36 The majority opinion noted that “[r]equiring that a criminal
defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the
capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.”37
As Moran and Rumbaugh make clear, mental competence is not a high
bar to cross.38 The Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards39 recognized that
this standard permits even severely mentally ill defendants to be found
competent.
30

Id. at 402.
Id. The test articulated in Rumbaugh has been cited in other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 960, 970 (9th Cir. 2007); Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 640–42
(11th Cir. 1993).
32
Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 329 n.2 (2000).
33
509 U.S. 389 (1993).
34
Id. at 409–411, 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35
Id. at 396–97 (majority opinion).
36
Id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37
Id. at 402 (majority opinion).
38
See also, J.C. Oleson, Swilling Hemlock: The Legal Ethics of Defending a Client Who
Wishes to Volunteer for Execution, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 147, 170 (2006) (explaining
that under prevailing legal standards, “it is entirely possible for a clinically depressed but
non-psychotic defendant to waive his appeals and to volunteer for execution”).
39
554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008).
31
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B. HASTENING DEATH IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT

Beginning in the mid-1970s, state courts considered arguments that
competent death-sentenced individuals could elect to discontinue medical
treatment even though it would hasten their deaths.40 These arguments were
based on a range of legal theories, including informed consent, right to
privacy, and proscriptions against battery.41 Courts generally recognized an
individual interest in refusing treatment, but balanced that right against the
state’s interests, which were most commonly identified as the preservation
of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of third parties, and the
protection of the integrity of health care professionals.42 In Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court assumed
without deciding that a competent person has a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest in discontinuing medical treatment, including artificial
nutrition and hydration, even if that refusal would cause or hasten her
death.43 The Court noted, however, that that individual right is not absolute.
Instead, it must be balanced against state interests.44
Currently, when competent individuals ask to discontinue lifesustaining medical intervention, hospitals and courts will generally permit
them to do so.45 This is not true, however, where the patient asks for a third
party to take an affirmative action that will hasten death. In Vacco v. Quill46
and Washington v. Glucksberg,47 the Supreme Court considered challenges

40

Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the “Right to Die” in the
Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1257–71 (1991).
41
Id.
42
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25, § 5.04. Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), provides a much-cited elaboration on these
state interests. Protecting third parties includes protecting “particularly minor children, from
the emotional and financial damage which may occur as a result of the decision of a
competent adult to refuse life-saving or life-prolonging treatment.” Id. at 426. The concerns
regarding the “ethical integrity of the medical profession” refer to tension between some
medical providers’ belief that their personal or medical ethics require them to sustain life at
all costs and their need to recognize their patients’ preferences. Id. at 426–27.
43
497 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1990). Cruzan, like the Quinlan case cited by Gary Gilmore,
involved the issue of surrogate decisionmaking, where family members asserted a right to
die on behalf of the patient because she was incompetent to do so.
44
Id. See also ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE LAW OF LIFE AND DEATH 161–62 (2011).
45
The Saikewicz court found the state’s interest in preserving human life to be strongest
where the question was whether, and not for how long, the individual’s life could be saved.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425–26. Meisel and Cerminara describe this as a “prognostic
approach” where the state’s interest shrinks as the individual nears death. MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 25, at 5-42–5-45. This interest is also diminished, however, where
the patient is competent. Id. at 5-45.
46
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
47
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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to state statutes that prohibited physicians from helping patients hasten
death. Withholding treatment is considered “passive” euthanasia, while
enlisting a doctor to administer a lethal drug is considered “active”
euthanasia.48 In Vacco, the statute’s challengers contended that no clear
distinction existed between active and passive euthanasia—discontinuing
treatment, after all, commonly requires an act such as turning off a
ventilator.49 They argued that the prohibition on assisted suicide violated
patients’ equal protection rights by restricting the right to die to those who
could die simply by discontinuing medical intervention.50 The Supreme
Court in Vacco rejected this argument, making clear that it saw an
important distinction between acts that hasten death by withholding
treatment or only treating disease symptoms, and those that involve the
administration of a substance with the intent to hasten death.51
In Glucksberg, opponents of the state law restrictions argued that
individuals had a fundamental right to hasten their own deaths and that,
therefore, state restrictions on physicians’ ability to assist them were
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the
Constitution provided a fundamental liberty interest right to receive help in
dying, and held that the state had legitimate interests in prohibiting such
assistance.52 The Court identified the state interests as: “(1) preserving life;
(2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties and use
of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family members and
loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and (6)
avoiding future movement toward euthanasia and other abuses.”53
The Supreme Court, however, saw no constitutional impediment to
states developing statutes permitting physician-assisted suicide. While there
was no federal constitutional right to assistance in dying, state legislatures
were free to experiment with permitting such assistance.54 Since
Glucksberg, Montana and New Mexico courts have struck down assisted
suicide bans and California,55 Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have
passed laws allowing physicians to help people die.56 As discussed below,

48

James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 N. ENGL. J. MED. 78, 78 (1975).
Vacco, 521 U.S. at 800–01.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 800–08.
52
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–735.
53
Id. at 728 n.20.
54
Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring).
55
California adopted its assisted-dying statute as this issue went to print.
56
OR. REV. STAT. 127.815 § 3.01(k)-(L) (2013); 18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 113 §§ 5283(a)
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.040 (k)-(l) (West 2011); Baxter v. Montana, 224 P.3d
1211, 1217 (Mont. 2009) (“[Nothing in Montana law] indicat[es] that physician aid in dying
49
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the regulatory framework established by these laws reveals limits that are
not imposed on the death-sentenced prisoner.
The assisted-dying statutes passed in California, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington permit physicians to prescribe a lethal dose of medication, but
patients must administer the medication themselves.57 The statutes restrict
the availability of physician-assisted suicide solely to an individual whom
two doctors attest has “an incurable and irreversible disease that has been
medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment,
produce death within six months.”58 In addition, Oregon and Washington
prohibit providing assistance to any terminally ill individual who suffers
from “a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing
impaired judgment.”59 Vermont imposes an arguably lower standard:
“‘Impaired judgment’ means that a person does not sufficiently understand
or appreciate the relevant facts necessary to make an informed decision.”60
A physician must “either verif[y] that the patient did not have impaired
judgment or refer[] the patient for an evaluation by a psychiatrist,
psychologist, or clinical social worker licensed in Vermont for confirmation
that the patient was capable and did not have impaired judgment.”61
C. ANALOGIZING THE VOLUNTEER TO THE SEVERELY ILL WHO SEEK
TO DIE

As outlined above and developed in greater detail below, the death row
volunteer may hasten execution by competently waiving his appeals. In the
medical context, the Supreme Court has rejected finding any constitutional
right to obtain assistance in dying (active euthanasia), as opposed to
discontinuing treatment (passive euthanasia). This raises the question of
whether a death row volunteer’s waiver represents an active or passive
effort to die. While a request to discontinue appeals—an act of omission—
appears analogous to a request to discontinue medical treatment, the
is against public policy”); Phil Milford, Right to Die with Doctor’s Help Affirmed in New
Mexico, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-14/right-todie-with-doctor-s-help-affirmed-in-new-mexico.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FVA35VNR.
57
OR. REV. STAT. 127.805 § 2.01(1); 127.815 § 3.01(L); 127.880 § 3.14 (doctors may
prescribe and dispense, but may not administer, lethal drugs); 18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 113 §
5283(a) (2012); § 5283(a)(13); § 5292 (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.020(1) (2011);
§ 70.245.040(1)(l)(i); § 70.245.180(1) (same).
58
OR. REV. STAT. 127.800 § 1.01(12) (2013); 127.815 § 3.01(1)(a); 127.820 § 3.02; 18
VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 113 § 5283(a), (a)(7) (2012); § 5281(10); WASH. REV. CODE §
70.245.040(1)(a); § 70.245.050; § 70.245.010(13) (2011).
59
OR. REV. STAT. 127.825 § 3.03 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.060 (2011).
60
18 VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 113 § 5281(5) (2012).
61
Id. at § 5283(a)(8).
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comparison to active assistance by a third party is more apt. As Blume
notes:
[T]he right to refuse life-saving medical treatment, assuming there is such a right, is
grounded in the individual’s right to bodily integrity, which is not at issue in the
volunteer context. Furthermore, in the refusal-of-treatment situation, a third party does
not have to take action to bring about the person’s death, which again is not true in the
volunteer context.62

Multiple third parties must act to hasten the volunteer’s death. Not
only must individuals working on behalf of the prison do something to the
prisoner’s body—in lethal injection, for example, someone must insert a
needle in the prisoner’s vein and start the flow of poisonous chemicals—but
the state must also impose an execution date. In these cases, we see
prisoners actively seek an execution date as the state generally will not set
one until appeals are concluded. While rare, some prisoners remain on
death row even after their appeals are exhausted. More commonly, a case
will simply pend on appeal while a court decides the case, unless the
prisoner campaigns to dismiss his appeal and have the court set his
execution date.63 Recognizing active euthanasia as the proper analogy
reveals the very different ways desires to die are regulated. Data on how the
law treats death-sentenced prisoners’ efforts to be killed are troubling when
considered in light of this comparison.
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS REGARDING DEATH ROW PRISONERS, INCLUDING
“VOLUNTEERS”
While empirical research on volunteers lags far behind that on those
with severe and terminal illness, new research, including a study I recently
conducted on Texas volunteers, contradicts several assumptions made in
much of the prior scholarship on volunteers. It suggests that it is time to
revisit the legal standard.
For my study of the thirty-one Texas prisoners death-sentenced after
Gregg who succeeded in hastening their execution by dropping their
appeals,64 I reviewed court documents, prison records, and media reports,

62

Blume, supra note 6, at 947–48 n.45.
In Reed v. State, AP-69,292 (Tex. Crim. App. March 29, 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1050 (1996), for example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals took twelve years to decide
Jonathan Reed’s case. The case pended for eight years before the court remanded the case
for a hearing.
64
Texas has by far the greatest number of volunteers. According to the Death Penalty
Information Center, twenty-six states had fewer than five volunteers; seven had five or more,
but fewer than ten. One had eleven. While my research found that the DPIC data were not
entirely accurate, even within the DPIC database, Texas stands out with twenty-eight
reported volunteers, more than double than that of the next highest state, Nevada. DEATH
63
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and conducted interviews with individuals who knew the prisoners. Unlike
previous empirical studies of volunteers, I compared this population to a
matched sample of non-volunteers, here, seventy-three Texas male death
row prisoners of the same race or ethnicity (according to prison records)
and approximate age who arrived on death row within six months of a
particular volunteer and who went through at least one round of appeals and
postconviction litigation.65 This comparison brings into focus what may—
and may not—distinguish volunteers from non-volunteers. These data also
underscore the relevance of the "right to die" legal categories to death row
prisoners.
A. DEATH ROW VOLUNTEERS GENERALLY DO NOT HAVE A
“TERMINAL” CONDITION COMPARABLE TO THAT WHICH LIMITS
APPLICABILITY OF “DEATH WITH DIGNITY” STATUTES

Terminal illness is conventionally understood by courts as an illness
that will kill the patient within six months.66 In my study of Texas
volunteers, none met this definition. Instead, over 80% had waived appeals
by the time their cases reached state postconviction proceedings. In other
words, they bypassed state postconviction proceedings, federal habeas

PENALTY INFO. CTR. EXECUTION DATABASE, supra note 3. In conducting my dissertation
research, I identified thirty-one death-sentenced Texas prisoners. Rountree, Directions for
Research, supra note 8, at 301–04.
65
Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 301–04. John Blume’s 2005 study
compared volunteers to non-incarcerated suicides. Blume, supra note 6. Vandiver,
Giacopassi, and Turner compared volunteers and non-volunteers nationally, which may have
obscured important state-by-state variations, among other things. Vandiver et al., supra note
3. According to the Death Penalty Information Center execution database, some counties—
like Harris County, Texas, for example—are responsible for more executions than several
states combined. Some states such as Nevada (eleven out of twelve), Oregon (two out of
two), and Washington (three out of five) have executed almost exclusively volunteers. Some
states execute so few that a prisoner might expect to live decades on death row before facing
execution. Death row conditions also vary across states. If any of these factors matter, it is
reasonable to believe that the dynamics in hastening execution could be very different in
different places. Comparing all volunteers with all those executed in the modern era erases
these differences. The likelihood of state-by-state variation obviously suggests caution in
generalizing from the Texas data (though Texas volunteers are the most numerous), as well
as the need for additional empirical research.
66
OR. REV. STAT. 127.800 §1.01(12) (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §70.245 (West 2011);
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 630 (Nev. 1990). Scholarship advocating for volunteers’
right to hasten death commonly overstates the inevitability of execution and omits the legal
understanding of “terminal.” See, e.g., Dama, supra note 7, at 1097 (prisoners “seek[ing] to
greet imminent and unavoidable death on their own terms”); Milner, supra note 7, at 298,
301 (“inevitable death”; death-sentenced prisoner has a condition that will “inevitably” take
his life).
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proceedings in district court, and federal appellate litigation. This litigation
would ordinarily take more than six months to conclude.
Further, not all death-sentenced prisoners will be executed. A study of
state and federal court reversal rates in capital cases between 1973 and 1995
found that courts found “serious, reversible error” in 68% of capital cases.67
During this period, state courts reversed 47% of capital cases, and federal
courts reversed 40% of those cases that were affirmed by the state courts.68
Of those prisoners granted a new trial because of prosecutorial or defense
counsel misconduct, 82% were resentenced to punishments less than
death.69 Not even Texas, which uses the death penalty vigorously, can claim
that any individual death-sentenced prisoner will be executed within six
months. Since the return of the death penalty in 1977, only 46% of those
sentenced to death in Texas have been executed, with almost 22.5%
winning reversal or commutation.70
B. DEATH ROW VOLUNTEERS’ INCREASED RISK FOR SUICIDE

While many might find it completely rational that those on death row
might want to end it all, in fact such prisoners are a minority.71 Proponents
of an unqualified Fourteenth Amendment right to execution contend that
the prisoners are essentially making a rational decision to end the suffering
they experience on death row. One commentator has suggested that “[t]he
simple reason most condemned prisoners want to terminate their appeals is
that they find conditions on death row intolerable.”72
The Texas data, however, indicate that most volunteers expressed a
desire for or sought execution very early, sometimes before they even got to
death row. Volunteers often had a constellation of reasons for giving up
their appeals. However, the most common sentiment expressed (by 61.3%
of volunteers) was that they sought execution because they believed it was
an appropriate punishment. Only a few prisoners (16.1%) complained about

67
JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973–
1995, at i (2000).
68
Id.
69
Id. at ii.
70
TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2012 –
STATISTICAL TABLES at 20 (2014)
71
For an expanded discussion of suicidality among volunteers, see Rountree, Directions
for Research, supra note 8, at 304–25.
72
Melvin I. Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of Appeal for Condemned Prisoners,
75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 568–69 (1984); see also, e.g., Milner, supra note 7.
Only Strafer factored this into an analysis of the voluntariness of the prisoner’s decision.
Strafer, supra note 4, at 885–94. It bears repeating that people with a painful but not terminal
illness may not legally obtain assistance in hastening death anywhere in the United States.
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the conditions of incarceration, as distinct from the fact of incarceration
(51.6%).73
Also concerning is the earliness of the prisoners’ decisions to hasten
death. For one, suicide in custody is strongly associated with the earliest
stages of custody.74 For another, psychological research on affective
forecasting “consistently shows that people are poor predictors of their
future well-being. Specifically, people overestimate the impact and duration
of negative emotions in response to loss.”75 This phenomenon may explain
why, at least in Texas, individuals facing the death penalty generally sought
execution at trial or soon after conviction. This pattern became particularly
apparent after a 1994 decision from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that prisoners were able to waive an adversarial direct appeal.76 Prior to
this decision, 75% of volunteers spent more than forty-eight months on
death row; after, only 27% did.77
In addition, significant psychological research of the severely ill, while
contested, suggests that those who seek to hasten death have unmet
psychiatric or palliative needs.78 Certainly, death row prisoners are
73
Meredith Martin Rountree, “The Things That Death Will Buy”: A Sociolegal
Examination of Texas Death-Sentenced Prisoners Who Sought Execution 90–92 (2012)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with the Journal).
74
DAVID A. CRIGHTON & GRAHAM J. TOWL, PSYCHOLOGY IN PRISONS 188 (2nd ed.
2008); see also Jo Borrill, Self-Inflicted Deaths of Prisoners Serving Life Sentences 1988–
2001, 40 BRIT J. FORENSIC PRAC. 30–38 (2002) (about half of lifers were likely to kill
themselves within a year of conviction).
75
Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge
in Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1708, 1708 (2008); see also
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80
IND. L.J. 155, 192–201 (2005) (citing evidence of death-sentenced prisoners’ adaptation to
death row); William E. Haley et al., Family Issues in End-of-Life Decision Making and Endof-Life Care, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 284 (2002).
76
Lott v. State, 874 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). In Lott, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals decided that where the prisoner waived direct appeal, it would review the
record—unassisted by any briefing—for “fundamental error,” a category of error that is
neither defined nor used in any other type of case. Not only does this decision raise more
questions than it answers with respect to the scope of the court’s review, it also created a
process for nonadversarial legal review where one already existed. Subsequent to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), counsel may file a brief that identifies possible legal
errors, and argues why the law is clear that those errors do not undermine the reliability of
the verdict. The appellate court considers this briefing in deciding whether to affirm the
conviction and sentence. In Lott’s case, the TCCA did not even have the benefit of this
minimal briefing.
77
Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 319.
78
N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 23–47, 153–81 (1994); BARRY
ROSENFELD, ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 77–109 (2004) (discussing research on
the role of depression, hopelessness, and pain in desires to hasten death, and requests for

2015]

CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS

167

substantially burdened by mental disorders.79 Cunningham and Vigen’s
2002 meta-analysis of the psychological literature found that the death row
population as a whole has a high prevalence of mental illness and substance
abuse and addiction. In their review of the literature on death row prisoners,
they noted that eleven out of thirteen clinical studies of death row prisoners
found “a high incidence of psychological symptoms and disorders, ranging
from maladaptive defenses to pervasive depression, mood lability, and
diminished mental acuity to episodic and chronic psychosis.”80 Death row
prisoners also “appear to have a disproportionate rate of serious
psychological disorders relative to a general prison population.”81 These
mental impairments may also impair their ability to imagine any
improvement in their situation.
In addition, prisoners generally have higher suicide rates than nonprisoners, and death row prisoners have higher rates of suicide as compared
to non-death-row prisoners.82 The two empirical studies looking specifically
at volunteers and suicide—Blume’s and my own—found a concerning
resemblance between those who commit suicide and those who volunteer.
After collecting questionnaire responses from legal team members in cases
involving volunteers and attempted volunteers from across the country,
Blume found similarities between those in the free world who have taken
their own lives and death row volunteers. In addition to being comprised
largely of white males, both groups had significant histories of mental
illness and substance abuse.83
In the Texas study I conducted, I identified traits associated with
suicide in prison and used those to compare Texas volunteers with a
matched sample of Texas death row prisoners who did not hasten their
executions. Several indicators present in the volunteer population were
consistent with the suicide literature. For example, as with other prisoners
who commit suicide, volunteers are more likely to have prior criminal
physician-assisted suicide) .
79
Blume, supra note 6, at 962–63; Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row
Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature,
20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 191 (2002). While mental dysfunction is prevalent in both the volunteer
and non-volunteer Texas groups, it is important to note that those seeking execution have an
incentive to minimize any mental problems. See Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 606;
Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 306–08.
80
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 79, at 200.
81
Id.
82
LINDSAY M. HAYES, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NIC ACCESSION
NO. 024308, NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE: 20 YEARS LATER 1–2 (2010) (jail and prison
suicide rates); CHRISTINE TARTARO & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE AND SELF-HARM IN PRISONS
AND JAILS 31 (2008) (death row suicide rate).
83
Blume, supra note 6, at 942.
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convictions, prior convictions for crimes against persons, and prior
experiences with incarceration than non-volunteers.84 The exception to this
was among those sentenced to death for offenses involving a domestic
crisis. This group’s criminal experience was lower than the other
volunteers, whether measured by their prior convictions, crimes against
persons, or time in prison. This too is consistent with the prison suicide
literature, which recognizes differences in suicide populations. 85
Differences in capital crimes also yielded some suggestive results.
Compared to other similarly situated death row prisoners, the Texas
volunteers were less likely to have committed the crime with another person
and more likely to have used a gun in the murder.86 Acting in groups may
encourage offending by diffusing responsibility.87 Conversely, solo
offending may concentrate a sense of greater responsibility in the individual
actor, both in the eyes of actor and those around him. This feeling of greater
responsibility may be linked to a conclusion that the individual offended for
dispositional rather than situational reasons; they broke the law because of
something about them, not because of something about the situation.88
Shame and guilt have been linked to an increased risk of suicide.89
These prisoners may feel that they are more culpable for their crimes
than those who are able to diffuse responsibility onto others. As a result,
they may feel that they deserve their punishment, and so ask for execution.
They may also translate this sense of increased culpability into a statement
84
Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 308–11. With respect to
characteristics of prisoner suicide, see, e.g., CRIGHTON & TOWL, supra note 74;
CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE IN STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL JAILS 7–8
(2005); Borrill, supra note 74, at 32, 35; Alison Liebling, Prison Suicide and Prisoner
Coping, 26 PRISONS 283 (1999) (though also noting contradictory findings).
85
See, e.g., Scott Eliason, Murder–Suicide: A Review of the Recent Literature, 37 J.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 371 (2009).
86
In the Texas Study, 61.3% of the volunteers used a gun, where 49.3% of the nonvolunteer sample used a gun. Where 49.3% of the non-volunteer sample committed the
capital crime with at least one other person, 29% of the volunteers had a co-participant.
Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 312.
87
Leanne F. Alarid et al., Group and Solo Robberies: Do Accomplices Shape Criminal
Form?, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2009).
88
Robert S. Feldman & Fred P. Rosen, Diffusion of Responsibility in Crime,
Punishment, and Other Adversity, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 318 (1978).
89
Craig J. Bryan et al., Guilt Is More Strongly Associated with Suicidal Ideation Among
Military Personnel with Direct Combat Exposure, 148 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 37, 40
(2013); Herbert Hendin & Ann P. Haas, Suicide and Guilt as Manifestations of PTSD in
Vietnam Combat Veterans, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 586, 589 (1991) (“The most significant
finding . . . was clear and consistent relationship between veterans’ combat-related guilt and
postservice suicidal behavior.”); David Lester, The Role of Shame in Suicide, 27 SUICIDE &
LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 352 (1997) (noting associations of shame with suicide and
encouraging further research).
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about their disposition or character. They may decide that they are
worthless and that they lack the possibility of redemption in this life. This
feeling could combine with other stressors or vulnerabilities to motivate a
decision to hasten death.
The finding about gun use is also provocative, because it suggests the
possibility of more impulsive or intoxicated lethal acts. Death row inmate
Steven Morin reportedly told a friend said that he did not intend to kill his
victim—he had been in the middle of stealing her car when she confronted
him—but “something came over him and the gun went off.”90 Richard
Foster described his gun homicide as an “accident” and “not intentional.”91
Whether Foster’s story is true or not, a prisoner’s impulsive use of the gun
could become part of his personal narrative of greater shame and guilt and
desire for self-destruction.
In addition to possibly having greater overall risk of suicide, some
individual volunteers were plainly suicidal. Charles Rumbaugh’s case is the
most dramatic. In the course of his testimony in support of his request to
waive his appeals, he announced:
All I really wanted to say is that it doesn’t matter to me; that I’ve already picked
my own executioner and I’ll just make them kill me. If they don’t want to do it . . .
if they don’t want to take me down there and execute me, I’ll make them shoot me.
I think I’ll make them shoot me right now.
He then pulled a prison-made knife from his pocket and was shot after he charged the
deputy U.S. Marshal, shouting “Shoot!” 92

Steven Renfro, another Texas death row prisoner, was described at
trial as having attempted “suicide by cop” at the time he was arrested. The
State’s psychiatrist interviewed Renfro for four hours prior to trial, and
testified: “He made it clear that he wanted it to end it that day [of his arrest],
to have been shot and killed. Renfro wanted to be and intended to be killed
that night by the police officers [and] wants to die now.”93 The defense
psychiatrist at trial believed that Renfro wanted help in hastening death
because of his religious beliefs, but that his suicidal depression could be
treated:
90
Stephen Peter Morin, MURDERPEDIA, http://murderpedia.org/male.M/m1/morinstephen-peter.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9MJZ-4BLD.
91
Foster v. Johnson, No. 4:92−cv−00615−Y (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2000) (findings of fact
on remanded issue); David Carson, Richard Foster, TEX. EXECUTIONS INFO. CTR. (Aug. 27,
2012), http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/216.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/T27RKH7U.
92
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1985).
93
Reporter’s Record (RR) at 27:3438, 3450, 3481, Renfro v. State, AP-72,794 (Tex.
Crim. App).
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Mr. Renfro . . . [is] profoundly depressed. . . . [H]e was suicidal before the murders
and he is still suicidal, but he doesn’t want to go to hell, so he wants someone else to
kill him. He’s in a lot of pain. He’s in a lot of emotional pain. His depression hasn’t
been treated. I expect he will always carry with him the guilt. He may not—if
appropriately treated, he may not always be suicidal.94

In all, these data demonstrate the salience of mental distress, mental
illness, and suicidality within this population.
C. DEATH ROW PRISONERS CAN HAVE MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIPS
WITH THIRD PARTIES

One scholar captured the way courts have isolated death row
volunteers from their social world by comparing the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Gilmore to the portrait painted by Norman Mailer in The
Executioner’s Song, his book about Gary Gilmore.95 She observes:
The Executioner’s Song portrays the grand, interconnected mass of humanity that
formed around even the least worthy person and illustrates how his fate included it all
. . . . [I]n contrast to the book’s dramatization of the connection among all of the
persons it names, the Court portrayed Gary Gilmore as an autonomous human being
and his mother as a separate person. It made no reference to anyone else. 96

Those advocating for an unfettered death row “right to die” further this
social atomization by marginalizing the death row prisoner’s connection to
family. The children of death-sentenced prisoners have diminished interests
in their parent’s decision to die because their parent cannot contribute
financially nor “participate in day-to-day family life as a normal parent.”97
This argument reduces familial contribution to financial support and
“normal” parenting in a way that excludes not only incarcerated parents but
also, e.g., some parents with disabilities or debilitating illness. Further, it is
contradicted by even the brief glimpses of death row prisoners’ family life
that appear in court documents, media accounts, and the empirical
literature.
One study of children of death row prisoners found “[t]he most
prevalent theme was the children’s discussion of the importance of having
their parent in their lives even if the relationship could only occur from
death row.”98 While many chafed at the obstacles prison imposed on
developing a meaningful relationship with their fathers, at least some of the

94

Id. at RR 29:3744–45.
NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER’S SONG (1979).
96
Ann Althouse, Standing, in Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (1991).
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Johnson, supra note 7, at 616.
98
Elizabeth Beck & Sandra J. Jones, Children of the Condemned: Grieving the Loss of a
Father to Death Row, 56 OMEGA 191, 197 (2007–2008).
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children discussed their father’s role in raising them, even from death row.99
For these children, their fathers provided advice, emphasized the
importance of going to school and staying away from crime, and acted as
agents of informal social control.100 The impact of their father’s execution
was generally “profound” and negative.101
While imperfect proxies of the condemned’s connectedness to others,
data from the Texas prison system regarding witnesses to executions
indicate that most volunteers had some social ties to the outside world. Of
the volunteers on whom I obtained information, 89.6% (27) invited
witnesses to their execution, and of those, 93.1% (25) had witnesses other
than clergy or attorneys. In addition, only 17.2% (5) of volunteers are
buried in the prison cemetery, where they are buried under their prison
number and not their name. So many volunteers being buried elsewhere
suggests that the vast majority had relationships with people outside of
prison that were strong enough that those individuals collected their bodies
and made arrangements to bury them privately.
Further, these data may understate relationships, as prisoners may have
had important social relationships not reflected in the prison records.
Anthony Cook, for instance, had only his spiritual advisor (who had
previously witnessed several executions) present at his execution, but his
mother, stepfather, brother, sister, in-laws, and cousins joined the spiritual
advisor at the funeral home after the execution.102 Cook’s burial in the
prison cemetery103 may simply reflect that his family did not have the
means to bury him. Another prisoner had no one from his nuclear family
witness his execution, but in his final days, he visited with his mother,
brothers, first wife, and his four children.104
In Texas competency hearings, while families are not always invisible,
no one represents their interests. In two cases,105 which were unusual for
involving family in the first place, family members positioned themselves
99

Id. at 197, 200, 201–04.
See, e.g., id. at 200 (after his father was executed, one child became aggressive
toward others, but once he turned eighteen, “he realized that he would have to find a way to
deal with his anger, lest he break a promise he had made to stay out of jail in order to care
for his father’s mother, whom has served as [the child’s] caretaker from the time that his
father was incarcerated.”)
101
Id. at 208.
102
Susan Blaustein, Witness to Another Execution: In Texas, Death Walks an Assembly
Line, HARPERS, May 1994, at 53.
103
Id. at 62.
104
Roy Bragg, Remorseful Killer Wants to Die for Crime/Families of Victims Can’t
Forgive, Forget, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 2, 1987, § 1, at 1.
105
Joe Fedelfido Gonzales, Jr., AP-71.253 (Tex. Crim. App.); James Scott Porter, No.
1:03–cv–448 (E.D. Tex.).
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as agents to dissuade the prisoner from ending his life or attest to his fixity
of purpose. The family members’ testimony about what the prisoner meant
to them, whether he had children who would suffer from his death, and
whether they thought his incarceration was a terrible burden on them was
not included in the court’s calculus in permitting the prisoner to hasten
execution.
D. VOLUNTEERS’ LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MAY NOT BE VIGOROUSLY
LITIGATED

The Fourteenth Amendment medical intervention cases inquire into
the effect of hastening death on the integrity of the medical profession.
Similar to doctors who are treating a patient who is terminally ill and
desires to hasten his death, attorneys representing a client who seeks to
hasten his execution are beset by conflicting professional and ethical
directives.
The legal academy has devoted substantial attention to lawyers’ ethical
responsibilities to the client who wants to die, reaching contradictory
conclusions.106 Further, while an agency role is the putative norm for the
attorney–client relationship, it is not the standard of practice in death
penalty cases. The American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
state forcefully:
Some clients will initially insist that they want to be executed—as punishment or
because they believe they would rather die than spend the rest of their lives in prison;
some clients will want to contest their guilt by not present mitigation. It is ineffective
assistance for counsel to simply acquiesce to such wishes, which usually reflect the
distorting effects of overwhelming feelings of guilt and despair rather than a rational
decision in favor of state-assisted suicide.107
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See, e.g., MICHAEL MELLO, THE UNITED STATES V. THEODORE JOHN KACZINSKI:
ETHICS, POWER, AND THE INVENTION OF THE UNABOMBER 25–26, 189–213 (1999) (criticizing
counsel for working against client’s wishes); Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on
Lawyers’ Ethics and Death Row Volunteers, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 808–09, 819
(2002) (reflecting on complexity of attorney’s task in representing volunteer and the limits of
professional rules); C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the
Ethics of Death Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 860–76 (2000) (describing
range of attitudes of death penalty cause lawyers regarding volunteers); Oleson, supra note
38, at 228–29 (arguing ethical rules not useful for lawyers representing volunteers and that
“ethical lawyer should refuse to acquiesce to the volunteering client’s wishes” because of
“death row syndrome”).
107
American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1009–10 (2003)
(emphasis added).

2015]

CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS

173

Further, “[t]he duty to investigate [mitigating evidence] exists
regardless of the expressed desires of a client.”108
In the Texas study, none of the successful Texas volunteers appears to
have had an adversarial hearing in which counsel marshaled lay and expert
witnesses to attack the assertions that the prisoner was competent and
waiving his rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.109 Many
attorneys were, nonetheless, plainly pained by reducing their role to simply
effectuating their client’s wish to die. Like doctors, the attorneys are torn
between what they see as the object of their professional skills—winning a
reversal of the conviction or sentence—and their duty to the individuals
whose lives they are entrusted with. When asked by the court whether he
thought his client was capable of waiving his appeals, one attorney finally
said, “Your Honor, these are the hardest questions that I’ve had to answer in
my life. It appears to me that he does.”110 Another stated in response to
similar questions, “I wish that I didn’t, Judge. I know that he does. He
understands everything.”111
E. LITIGATION WITHOUT COUNSEL THREATENS THE INTEGRITY OF
THE LEGAL PROCESS

Nonadversarial waiver proceedings can leave critical factual questions
unanswered,112 and in Texas at least, important legal questions may also
remain unaddressed. While statutes suggest almost every state requires
“automatic” judicial review of death sentences, Texas offers a cautionary
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Id. at 1021.
In Christopher Swift’s and Michael Rodriguez’s cases, counsel actively advocated
against their clients’ wishes in the course of the hearing on the waiver, but in both cases,
counsel relied primarily on legal argument. Through cross-examination they challenged
some of the evidence, but they presented no separate evidence or experts. Hearing,
Rodriguez v. Quarterman, 3:06–cv–00965–G (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2007) Hearing, State v.
Swift, F-2003–1720–C (Denton Cty, Tex. Feb. 2, 2006). Based on a press report, Stephen
Morin’s counsel sought a stay of execution to raise the issue of mental competency, but the
trial judge, based on his observations of Morin, concluded Morin was mentally competent
and refused a hearing. Jacque Crouse & Terry Donahue, Lawyer: ‘Blood’ on Mattox’ Hands,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, March 13, 1985, at A5. Ramon Hernandez’s trial counsel
unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution as a “next friend.” Hernandez’s former counsel
argued that Hernandez’s waiver was based on a mistake of law, not mental incompetence.
Lovelace v. Lynaugh, 809 F.2d 1136, 1137 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Dec. 19, 1997 11.071 Hearing at 54, Ex parte Tuttle, AP–72,387 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997).
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July 16, 1998 Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal, State v. Foust,
AP–73,130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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See Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 605–14 (describing questionable mental
health assessments and court proceedings normalizing desire to die).
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example of possible gaps being left between the law on the books and the
law in action.
During the sentencing phase of Christopher Jay Swift’s trial, Swift
refused to permit his lawyers to present mitigating evidence to persuade the
jury to sentence him to life rather than death.113 One court-appointed
psychiatrist determined that Swift was insane at the time of the crime. Swift
explained to the court that he wanted the death penalty because voices in his
head “haunt me daily, and I feel that, you know, death is going to be the
only thing that takes them away.”114 Swift’s direct appeal lawyer filed a
substantial brief in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) arguing
that imposing the death penalty under these circumstances violated the
Constitution. After Swift was granted the right to proceed pro se, the TCCA
“unfiled,” or removed from the record of the case, the brief filed by counsel
and did not consider it in affirming Swift’s conviction and sentence.115
Swift’s is a particularly stark example because the court explicitly
disregarded a legal argument regarding the unconstitutionality of his
execution. In most volunteer cases, however, no brief would be filed in the
first place, as counsel already would have been discharged. In these cases,
no counsel alerts the appellate court to questions of innocence, mental
illness, racial bias, or official misconduct—issues that fundamentally
undermine the legitimacy of the death penalty.
III. SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON RIGHTS TO DIE
What accounts for these differences in judicial thinking about
terminally ill and death-sentenced people? How did the despised and
marginalized end up with a more expansive right than the innocent ill?
Conversely, others may wonder why anyone would be surprised that those
sentenced to death would have an easier time getting themselves killed.
That is the point of the punishment, after all.
While this outcome may not be surprising on the surface, the reasons
for it are not the obvious ones. It is not simply that judges hope for some
kind of political or ideological benefit from hastening an execution—
indeed, in the Texas cases, at least two judges expressed great discomfort
when faced with prisoners who sought execution.116 Instead, these legal
standards are animated by beliefs about sick people, free will, criminality,

113
Transcript of Record at 35:28–35 and 36:9, State v. Swift, F-2003-1720-C (Denton
Cty., Tex. 2006).
114
Id. at 35:34.
115
State v. Swift, AP-75,186, 2006 WL 269266 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2006).
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2 Reporter’s Record at 40, State v. Gonzales, AP-72,253 (Tex. Crim. App.); July 6,
2000 Hearing at 20–21, State v. Hayes, AP-73,830 (Tex. Crim. App.).
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mental illness, and who is on death row. Further, they are embedded within
a particular historical context.
A. AMONG THE VERY ILL

Self-killing has a long history of state proscription, though desires to
die have become substantially medicalized as self-killing is now more
likely to be seen as potentially pathological rather than unpatriotic.117 The
sociolegal framework undergirding medical decisions hastening death
reflects a number of questions about the appropriate roles for individuals,
medicine, government, and God to play in ending life, as well as the
relationships between desires for death and mental illness. These questions
are situated in a particular historical moment that is shaped by the freighted
history of euthanasia movements, the heart-rending realities of modern
medicine’s capabilities, the revolution in the doctor–patient relationship,
and the emergence of the civil rights discourse. The ascendance of the
rights framework in medical decisionmaking enabled euthanasia advocates
to recast their advocacy of hastening death as a type of right, where
previously it had been seen as a vehicle for social improvement. In addition
to being politically expedient, it also fixed the legal question within a
framework that requires investigating and balancing competing interests.
While hardly the first legal case to present the question of
discontinuing or foregoing medical treatment, Karen Ann Quinlan’s case
gripped the public imagination. It is widely cited as the beginning of the
modern American discussion about the right to die.118 Newsweek, which
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See, e.g., GEORGES MINOIS, HISTORY OF SUICIDE 7–9 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans.,
1999); id. at 9 (describing suicides from the Middle Ages “condemned as murder, [leading]
to savage punishment inflicted on the dead body and to confiscation of the estate of the
deceased”); see also FOLEY, supra note 44, at 154–56; MINOIS, supra, at 33 (describing St.
Thomas Aquinas’s influential argument against suicide as an offense against nature, society
and God); id. at 282–83 (describing decline in criminal prosecution and punishment of
corpses of suicides in eighteenth century France); id. at 291 (noting that the French king
“could not tolerate [subjects] disposing of life freely, thus weakening his kingdom and his
authority”); id. at 324 (noting political assertion that “it was ‘medically demonstrated that
candidates for suicide are pathological cases’”).
118
See, e.g., IAN DOWBIGGIN, A MERCIFUL END: THE EUTHANASIA MOVEMENT IN
MODERN AMERICA 146–47 (2003) (quoting a comparison of Quinlan’s case to Brown v.
Board of Education); ELAINE FOX ET AL., COME LOVELY AND SOOTHING DEATH: THE RIGHT
TO DIE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (1999) (noting that Quinlan “dramatically
focused public attention on the passive euthanasia issue”); ELIZABETH ATWOOD GAILEY,
WRITE TO DEATH: NEWS FRAMING OF THE RIGHT TO DIE CONFLICT, FROM QUINLAN’S COMA
TO KEVORKIAN’S CONVICTION 18–19 (2003) (citing media coverage in the wake of the
Quinlan case).
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featured her case as its cover story in November 1975, economically
invoked common anxieties surrounding decisions to hasten death.119
The article first outlined the primary legal dispute: after recognizing
that his daughter would not recover from a persistent vegetative state, Karen
Ann Quinlan’s father sought to be appointed her guardian in order to ask
the hospital to turn off the ventilator that supported her breathing. The
hospital refused. The parties went to court. The story then quoted one
lawyer arguing that Quinlan was not “brain dead” and that by removing the
ventilator, the court would be “just extinguish[ing] life because she is an
eyesore.”120 Another asked, “Where do we draw the line?”121 Nazi
Germany’s practice of euthanizing “cripples, mental incompetents,
epileptics, the elderly and others held to be socially undesirable” was
invoked,122 and a physician recalled an infant born with a treatable but
highly disfiguring condition. The child was allowed to die, and “‘Nobody
said a word,’ according to the . . . doctor. ‘I think it’s because we live in an
era of the Body Beautiful, so the sight of a kid with almost nothing below
the waist gave everybody pause.’”123
The case was also described as making public a “private and personal
plight.”124 Doctors expressed concern about legal supervision over (and
possible sanctions for) medical decisionmaking, as well as the professional
and ethical conflicts created by requests to hasten death. At the same time,
medical advances were blamed for creating the painful situation in the first
place. New technologies permitted life to continue, even as definitions of
life and death shifted. Whether because of the mysteries of the human body
or medical progress, terminal prognoses were also called into question.
1. Twentieth-Century Euthanasia Movements
The contemporary so-called “Right to Die” and “Death with Dignity”
movements were not the first time Americans organized to promote
euthanasia.125 Prior euthanasia advocates rejected the notion of spiritual
transcendence in suffering, and their enthusiasm for science and human
control led advocates to embrace euthanasia as part of a larger eugenics
program of social improvement. Not only could those suffering find a
peaceful death, but those burdened by severe mental or physical impairment
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Matt Clark, A Right to Die?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 1975, at 58.
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Id. at 59.
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Id. at 67.
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could be killed as painlessly as possible, for their own good and the good of
the larger society.126 Nazi euthanasia practices (and eugenic intent) exposed
the dangers state-sanctioned euthanasia could pose for the socially
vulnerable and marginalized, however, and consequently discredited the
American movement’s framework of euthanasia as a tool for social
improvement. As Americans learned of eugenics-inspired euthanasia
programs conducted by German doctors, the American euthanasia
movement became quiescent.127 The “rights” framework, however, emerged
in the wake of the civil rights movements of the 1960s, and offered a
powerful new discursive tool.128
2. The Role of Organized Medicine in Contemporary Movements
The rights framework reconfigured the American euthanasia
movement from one oriented toward the good of society to one promoting
the autonomy and dignity of the individual at a time when patients were
demanding a more active role in their medical care.129 In addition, it created
an avenue into court, an institution capable of putting pressure on the
medical profession. The euthanasia movement has been credited with
improving pain management specifically and palliative care more
generally.130 At the same time, the legal rights-based framework accords
doctors a legitimate presence in legal proceedings. Their ethical
responsibilities and professional training, as well as their prognoses,
position them as important interlocutors as courts decide these claims.
Relatedly, the patient’s demands for autonomy—at the heart of the right to
die conceptual framework—are dialogically related to the physician’s
demands to direct how medical technology is to be used.
3. Fear of the Slippery Slope
Concerns about a slippery slope, where euthanasia is first intended to
offer a choice to the suffering individual with a terminal illness, but then
becomes a decision made by others for those not similarly afflicted, have
both an historical and contemporary foundation. Historically, not only did
the Nazi example demonstrate how socially vulnerable people could
become the targets of nonvoluntary euthanasia, but statements by advocates
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for the American euthanasia movement at the beginning of the twentieth
century clearly indicated they saw legislation permitting voluntary
euthanasia for those facing death was simply a first step toward eventual
embrace of nonvoluntary euthanasia for “monster” babies and individuals
with mental and intellectual disabilities.131
The New York Task Force132 expressed concern about a slippery slope,
in light of the tension in compassion arguments:
Policies limiting suicide to the terminally ill, for example, would be inconsistent with
the notion that suicide is a compassionate choice for patients who are in pain or
suffering. As long as the policies hinge on notions of pain or suffering, they are
uncontainable; neither pain nor suffering can be gauged objectively, nor are they
subject to the kind of judgments needed to fashion coherent public policy.133

Reports from European countries where euthanasia is legal
demonstrate the Task Force’s concerns were not farfetched. While disputed,
some studies suggest that in the Netherlands at least some physicians have
engaged in unsolicited euthanasia and complied with euthanasia requests
from patients suffering from depression, but no physical ailment of any
kind, much less one that would cause incurable physical deterioration.134 A
recent study notes that a group of Belgian physicians favoring euthanasia
also tend to support extending euthanasia to minors “who can value their
interests.”135
The New York State Task Force also expressed concern about a
disproportionate impact of legalized euthanasia on poor people or members
131
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society”); id. at 51 (“[s]upport for involuntary mercy killing [was] a fairly common attitude
among early proponents of euthanasia”); id. at 57 (voluntary euthanasia bills seen as an
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of minority communities. In addition to disparities in access to medical and
mental health care, the Task Force noted that care “will be practiced
through the prism of social inequality and prejudice that characterizes the
delivery of services in all segments of society, including health care. . . .
[Physicians] are not exempt from the prejudices manifest in other areas.”136
This raises the prospect that institutional structures and professionals may
encourage disadvantaged individuals to seek euthanasia.
4. Contemporary Legal Safeguards
Vermont’s, Washington’s, and Oregon’s “Death with Dignity” statutes
seek to meet at least some of physicians’ professional concerns by
permitting physician-assisted suicide (where the physician only prescribes a
lethal dose of medication), but not euthanasia (where the physician
administers the lethal dose), and by requiring that the patient have “an
incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and
will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six
months,” as attested to by two physicians.137 In addition, the Oregon and
Washington statutes explicitly recognize depression can play a role in
desires to hasten death, and Vermont, Oregon, and Washington limit
physician-assisted suicide to those whose judgment is not impaired by
mental illness.138
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B. AMONG THE DEATH-SENTENCED

1. Historical Context
Conventional legal inquiry into appeal waivers usually begins with
Rees v. Peyton: does the prisoner have the “capacity to appreciate his
position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or
abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering
from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his
capacity in the premises.”139 Melvin Rees himself sought to withdraw his
Supreme Court appeal in 1965, as support for the death penalty waned.140
Having failed to coax the parties into a negotiated resolution of the case, the
Court ordered the lower court to adjudicate Rees’s competence.141 After
multiple evaluations, the lower court found Rees incompetent, and the
Supreme Court took no further formal action on the case.142 Only after
Rees’s natural death in 1995 did the Court dismiss his case.143
While this legal standard is widely cited, the contentious and insistent
Gary Gilmore we saw at the beginning of this Article was ultimately more
important in defining the modern volunteer. Much of Gilmore’s case seems
peculiar to Gilmore—certainly no other volunteer inspired a Pulitzer Prizewinning book, two television movies, the cover of a national newsweekly, a
Saturday Night Live skit, and a pop song144—but in his case we see not only
the seeds of future death penalty cases, but also legal logics that help
explain how the Supreme Court came to take such a different view of deathseeking prisoners and death-seeking patients.
Gilmore, sentenced to death only months after the death penalty was
reinstated in the United States,145 was not as easily put off as Rees. At a trial
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court hearing after sentencing, Gilmore told the court, “You sentenced me
to die. Unless it’s a joke or something, I want to go ahead and do it.”146 In a
perfunctory hearing before the Utah Supreme Court, Gilmore, represented
by counsel who assisted rather than opposed his efforts, testified that he
knew he had a right to appeal; that he had told his attorneys that he did not
want to appeal; that he had told him during the trial that if found guilty, he
would prefer death to imprisonment; and that he preferred to keep the
originally scheduled execution date.147 Despite protests from Gilmore’s
prior lawyer, no formal mental competency or waiver hearing was
conducted.148
Less than five months after his crime and two months after his
sentencing, Gilmore’s case went before the Supreme Court.149 Gilmore’s
mother, Bessie Gilmore, proceeded in the Court as a “next friend” to stay
his execution, arguing that he was not competent to knowingly and
intelligently waive his rights. Bessie Gilmore’s stay application informed
the Court of “petitioner’s history of suicidal tendencies, his November 16,
1976, suicide attempt, and his repeated request to be executed [to] indicate
that petitioner’s original waiver of appeal is an attempt to commit
suicide.”150 It cited psychiatric sources discussing the “impulse to suicide as
a form of mental illness.”151
The Attorney General responded that Gilmore’s post-trial suicide
attempt was not pathological, but simply an “attempt [] to effectuate the
sentence himself.”152 His desire to die was rational: “Mr. Gilmore had
sufficient experience of prison life that he was able to form an accurate
estimation of what it would be like for him to languish in prison.”153
Gilmore should be accorded the “right to make a rational choice within the
framework of his circumstances and personal philosophical constructs.”154
In addition to having a markedly swifter adjudication than Rees,
Gilmore set up a very different mental health contest. Where Rees was
proceed. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gilmore committed his capital crime on July 19 and 20,
1976, and he was sentenced to death on October 7, 1976. Blume, supra note 144, at 204.
146
MAILER, supra note 95, at 467.
147
Blume, supra note 144, at 213.
148
Id.
149
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
150
Application for a Stay of Execution at 31, In re Gilmore, No. A-453 (U.S. Dec. 2,
1976) [hereinafter “Stay App”].
151
Id. at 31–32.
152
Response to Application for Stay of Execution at 57, In re Gilmore, No. A-453 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1976) [hereinafter “Stay Resp.”].
153
Id.
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Id.

182

MEREDITH MARTIN ROUNTREE

[Vol. 105

delusional and psychotic,155 the Gilmore litigation instead focused on rival
interpretations of his suicidality and its implications for his competence to
waive his appeals.156
The Supreme Court stayed Gilmore’s execution on December 3, 1976,
to give it time to review certain documents. Ten days later, it lifted the stay,
summarily finding that Gilmore was mentally competent and had made a
knowing and intelligent waiver.157 Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall
dissented, complaining that without appellate review, no one could know
whether the Utah death penalty statute was constitutional.158 According to
the dissents, this question needed to be resolved since Gilmore could not,
under the Eighth Amendment, consent to an unconstitutional punishment.159
Justice Marshall’s dissent paints a picture of informal, rushed, and (in
his view) unreliable proceedings. The experts—all of whom worked for the
State—had never been subjected to adversarial examination, and portions of
the transcript regarding defense counsel’s opinion of Gilmore’s competence
and legal claims were not transcribed.160 In Gilmore's case, we see problems
plaguing the adjudication of volunteers, at least in Texas.161 Questionable
mental health assessments and nonadversarial proceedings are accepted.
Desires to hasten execution can stand alongside suicide attempts without
defeating competence. The mother’s interest in preventing execution is
entirely contingent on the competency finding. The state interest in the
legality of the conviction and sentence was a concern to no one but the
dissenters.
Executing Gilmore also provided death penalty proponents with the
opportunity to demonstrate the necessity of the death penalty. As Blume
points out, Gilmore presented none of the familiar concerns about the death
penalty. He was white, unrehabilitated after repeated stints in prison, and
not plainly mentally ill. He appeared intelligent, remorseless, and
obnoxious, and he admitted guilt consistent with other compelling evidence.
Add to that the fact that Utah did not have the cultural baggage of the
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former Confederacy, Gilmore became, “in many respects, the perfect person
to usher in the new era of executions.”162
Blume argues that “the path was set” when the Supreme Court
permitted Gilmore to waive his appeals.163 Without disputing Blume’s view
of the contingent importance of Gilmore, the larger sociopolitical context
helped cement and extend the Court’s decision. The 1970s witnessed
important shifts in the American criminal justice system. The mobilization
of pro-death-penalty activists after Furman v. Georgia164 struck down
several states’ death penalty statutes, and the rise of “law and order” politics
alongside more retributive penal policies have been chronicled elsewhere.165
Certainly Gilmore, with his extensive juvenile and adult history of crime
and imprisonment, fit nicely within the then-contemporary disenchantment
with the rehabilitation model.166
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court was in the middle of the
contentious debate regarding rights held by those accused of crimes. Most
relevant here is the Court’s landmark decision in Faretta v. California.167 In
Faretta, the Supreme Court decided that individuals have a constitutional
right to represent themselves in criminal proceedings. They must not be
required to have a lawyer “force[d]” upon them, even at a cost of a less
reliable proceeding: “[A]lthough he may conduct his own defense
ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”168
The dissenters inveighed against this individualistic stance that it
believed would undermine the criminal justice system as a whole:
That goal [of justice] is ill-served, and the integrity of and public confidence in the
system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the defendant’s
ill-advised decision to waive counsel. The damage thus inflicted is not mitigated by
the lame explanation that the defendant simply availed himself of the ‘freedom’ ‘to go
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Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974)). One television writer reportedly said at the time that
Gilmore’s case was “an open commentary on the utter failure of our prison system to
rehabilitate anybody.” MAILER, supra note 95, at 572.
167
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
168
Id. at 834 (internal citations and punctuation omitted).
163

184

MEREDITH MARTIN ROUNTREE

[Vol. 105

to jail under his own banner.’ The system of criminal justice should not be available
as an instrument of self-destruction.169

These multiple historical, social, and legal strands combined to give
Gilmore a symbolic importance extending beyond a message that the death
penalty was once again a punishment available to states. When the Supreme
Court refused to stay Gilmore’s execution, it may also have been signaling
that it would limit the reach of cause lawyers170 by strengthening the agency
of the condemned individual, to the exclusion of broader systemic
considerations.
In addition, as Gilmore himself noted in his reference to Karen Ann
Quinlan quoted at the beginning of this Article, his desire to hasten death
was situated within a cultural moment when a discourse of rational death
and a right to die gained national prominence against a backdrop of the civil
rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s.171
2. Logic of Death Penalty Law
The different legal logics of death penalty and terminal illness also
contribute to different outcomes. Where decisions to hasten death in the
context of medical interventions require weighing state interests against the
individual’s desire, volunteers require no such balancing. Because a deathsentenced prisoner’s desire to hasten death is conceptualized solely within
the framework of rules and waiver, the concerns that we see in the context
of the right to die of the terminally ill cannot penetrate.
Significantly, the fact that this waiver occurs in the context of the
death penalty may strengthen the logic of rules, rather than diminish it.
While the idea that “death is different” is fundamental to Eighth
Amendment death penalty jurisprudence, it is usually operationalized
through procedural safeguards, like rules. David Garland argues that
American death penalty law evolved to distance the death penalty from
lynching.172 One strategy included “rationalizing and juridifying”173 the
169
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application of the death penalty.174 The Supreme Court, Garland explains,
developed a “discipline of legal rules and procedural propriety” to “us[e]
the values of liberalism (rule-based restraints on state power, respect for the
individual, due process, legality) to reshape America’s capital punishment
practice.”175 The existence of rules and procedures, in other words,
contribute to constituting a legitimate death penalty. Hand in hand with a
logic of rules is the idea that rules can be waived, provided, of course, that
the waiver follows certain rules. The waiver model works well—indeed, it
can only exist—within a discourse of rules. It acknowledges the existence
of rules, even as the individual invokes a desire not to take advantage of
them.
This conceptualization shapes the function of mental illness, as is plain
in the Gilmore Supreme Court litigation. Both the application for a stay of
execution filed by Gilmore’s mother and the response from the Attorney
General of Utah spoke directly to Gilmore’s efforts to kill himself.176 The
desire to hasten death, however, was legally relevant only to the extent that
it signified mental illness that undercut the validity of the waiver. Bessie
Gilmore’s stay application argued that “[t]o permit a man to kill himself
through legal process by his lack of rational choice affronts a most basic
sense of justice,” and specified that a proper waiver is the mechanism for
protecting justice.177 It did not draw on, for example, the historical
proscriptions on suicide elaborately described by the Supreme Court in
Glucksberg.178 The waiver model reconfigures the relevance of mental
illness such that it relates only to the ability to waive, not to the desire to
die.
3. Cultural Frames of Mental Illness and Criminality
The legal marginalization of mental distress among condemned
prisoners may reflect a larger cultural ambivalence regarding depression as
a form of mental illness.179 At least in the criminal context, the law also
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generally fails to acknowledge the impact of impaired affective (as opposed
to cognitive) states on decisionmaking.180 Certainly Melvin Rees, with his
delusional thinking and psychotic preoccupations, conformed more closely
to widespread ideas of what mental illness looks like than did Gary
Gilmore.181 Notably, the Supreme Court has expressed greater concern over
the reliability of the procedures to evaluate mental competency in both Ford
v. Wainwright182 and Panetti v. Quarterman,183 both of which involved
prisoners with serious delusions, than it has in volunteer cases.184
This difference in interpreting depression may also reflect a bias
against recognizing mental dysfunction in criminals as it contradicts
prevalent ideas about criminal intentionality and autonomy.185 A Newsweek
magazine cover featuring Gary Gilmore trades in romantic notions of death
seeking.186 Gilmore looks directly at the camera, with what could be
construed as a perhaps rakish, perhaps slightly menacing, grin on his face.
He wears a short-sleeved prison jumpsuit that reveals handcuffs and his
tattooed forearms. “Death Wish” is stamped in red on Gilmore’s torso. It is
easy to read into the image that Gilmore has a “death wish” because he is a
thrill-seeking outlaw, not because he is depressed and sees no point to
living.
Perhaps tapping into these assumptions about free will is the
persistence of the metaphor of “volunteer” to describe execution-hastening
death-sentenced prisoners. The word “volunteer” amplifies connotations of
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free will and suggests a kind of civic-mindedness. Conversely, the notions
of helplessness and passivity embedded in the “sick role,”187 as well as the
historical ghosts of euthanasia, may inhibit our calling those using the
Vermont, Oregon, and Washington statutes “volunteers.” As Thibodeau,
McClelland, and Boroditsky’s experimental work found, metaphors shape
our understanding of the underlying social problem, as well as its
solution.188
IV. PROPOSED ANALYSIS FOR ADJUDICATING REQUESTS TO EXPEDITE
EXECUTION
Explaining why the law treats these desires to die so differently does
not justify the different legal approaches. I propose a legal standard that
acknowledges that many of the issues surrounding desires to die are similar,
whether one is imprisoned or not—with one important exception. Where
assisted-death is illegal in most states, I do not propose an equivalent ban
on the execution of volunteers. While this may be the more consistent
approach, I recognize that it is an impractical position at this time. Instead, I
offer a way to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the disparity in how the law
treats desires to die.
Using the right to die in the medical context as a template, the standard
for volunteers should consider state interests regarding the preservation of
life, prevention of suicide, interests of innocent third parties, and
implications for a profession (here reconceptualized to include the
individual lawyer and the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole). In
addition, prison institutional considerations should be integrated into the
187

In the 1950s, sociologist Talcott Parsons theorized the “sick role” which, among other
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analysis, as they are in the prisoner medical care cases. Finally, to ensure a
genuinely adversarial proceeding in which the full range of the state’s
interests is presented to the court, independent counsel should be appointed.
A. STATE’S INTEREST IN PREVENTING SUICIDE AND PRESERVING LIFE

As the data described above make clear, the risk of suicidality in the
volunteer population is real and should be integrated into the legal analysis.
Mental health information should not simply affect the validity of the
waiver, but should also be taken into account in assessments of impaired
judgment and the will to live more generally.
Further, while Timothy Kaufman-Osborne argues that the prisoner dies
at the pronouncement of sentence,189 this is true in only the most symbolic
sense. The state has an interest in even the life of the death-sentenced
prisoner. The Eighth Amendment guarantees of food, essentially safe and
clean shelter, clothing, and medical care extend to the death-sentenced as
much as they do to other prisoners.190 Some prisons have rules prohibiting a
mentally competent prisoner from hurting himself or from permitting
another to hurt him.191
California death row prisoner Clarence Allen’s attempt to refuse
medical treatment lays bare the contradictions in how and when prisoners
have rights to die. Allen, an elderly prisoner with significant health
problems and physical disabilities, suffered a heart attack about three
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months before his scheduled execution.192 The Associated Press reported
that:
Having suffered a heart attack in September, Allen had asked prison authorities to let
him die if he went into cardiac arrest before his execution, a request prison officials
said they would not honor.
“We would resuscitate him,” said prison spokesman Vernell Crittendon, then execute
him. 193

This is consistent with case law. A few courts have permitted prisoners to
refuse treatment,194 but generally courts have allowed prisoners to intervene
forcefully when prisoners try to die, citing the state’s interest in preserving
life and preventing suicide. 195In In re Caulk,196 the prison sought to forcefeed a prisoner facing life without parole in prison.
The prisoner had decided to stop eating because he:
[N]ever expects to be released from prison again. He says he is tired, unhappy,
disappointed with the promise that life holds, that he does not ‘belong on the streets.’
He maintains that if he cannot live freely, he does not want to live at all . . . . He
testified that he has hurt a lot of people, and whenever he feels pain on his starvation
diet, he believes he is paying another debt for his past misdeeds.197

Caulk offered to release the prison from any liability for his death, and
did not appear to the court to be starving himself for any secondary gain,
such as a transfer to another prison.198 The court acknowledged that Caulk
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had a state constitutional right to privacy protecting him from “unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity,” but, since “no constitutional right is
absolute,” it weighed Caulk’s constitutional right against the state’s
interests.199 The court concluded:
Although the defendant contends that he is allowing himself to die, rather than
committing suicide, it is important to note what this case does not involve. This is not
a situation where an individual, facing death from a terminal illness, chooses to avoid
extraordinary and heroic measures to prolong his life, albeit for a short duration.
Rather, the defendant has set the death-producing agent in motion with the specific
intent of causing his own death, and any comparison of the two situations is
superficial. Thus, in these circumstances, the State’s interest in preserving life and
preventing suicide dominates.200

In Laurie v. Senecal,201 the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered
whether a healthy adult male prisoner . . . has a constitutional right to end his life by
starvation as long as he has no dependents who might suffer as a result of his demise
and as long as he is not suffering from any psychotic or delusional condition and is
not using his self-impelled starvation as a means of extracting concessions from the
director.202

The prisoner had no physical ailment. He simply “no longer desired to live
because of the stigma of his conviction” and felt “continuous psychological
pain” because of his crime.203 Despite finding the prisoner was competent,
“had made a knowing and voluntary decision to stop taking food and water
for the purpose of ending his life,” and had no dependents who would suffer
from his death, the court found the prison had a “right and duty to
intervene” 204 because of the state’s interest in preserving life and
preventing suicide. “In respect to an incarcerated prisoner, we believe that
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holding that prison failed to meet evidentiary burden to forcefeed). For a discussion of the
relevance of Cruzan and Glucksberg to prison hunger strikes, see Mara Silver, Testing
Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of Self-Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631
(2005).
199
In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 95 (internal citations omitted).
200
Id. at 97 (internal citations omitted).
201
666 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1995).
202
Id. at 808.
203
Id. at 807.
204
Id. at 807–08.
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there is no right under either the State or the Federal Constitution to
override the compelling interest of the state in the preservation of his or her
life and the prevention of suicide.”205
In Maine, a court permitted a jail to force-feed a prisoner who
“refus[ed] to take life-sustaining sustenance as a result of a sense of
hopelessness.”206 The court reasoned that the sheriff of the jail had “the
obligation to take reasonable measures to maintain the wellbeing of
individuals in his custody.”207The Seventh Circuit limited prisoners’ right to
refuse medical treatment by referring to the psychological impact of
incarceration (and the state’s duty to mitigate that impact).208
Free people who are sane have a liberty interest in refusing life-saving medical
treatment, and likewise in refusing to eat, a method by which some elderly people
commit suicide. But either prisoners don’t have such an interest, or it is easily
overridden.
The reasons are practical. (No longer does one hear that prisoners must not be allowed
to evade punishment by killing themselves and thus “cheating the gallows.”) . . .
Prison officials who let prisoners starve themselves to death would also expose
themselves to lawsuits by the prisoners’ estates. Reckless indifference to the risk of a
prisoner’s committing suicide is a standard basis for a federal civil rights suit. The
idea behind liability in such cases is that incarceration can place a person under
unusual psychological strain and the jail or prison under a commensurate duty to
prevent the prisoner from giving way to the strain. The analysis is applicable when
suicide takes the form of starving oneself to death.209

The remorse, hopelessness, and stress of incarceration articulated in
these cases are strikingly similar to the reasons many death row volunteers
give for wanting to die.210 In the death row context, of course, these reasons
are accepted.
Finally, in the context of the death penalty, accepting the prisoner’s
reason for wanting to hasten execution is also legally questionable. Not
only should this be irrelevant, as Anthony Casey states bluntly, 211 but this

205

Id. at 809.
Ross v. Emerson, No. CV-05-262, 2005 WL 3340087, at *1 (Me. Super. Nov. 3,
2005) (order denying motion to dissolve temporary restraining order).
207
Id. at *2.
208
Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006).
209
Id. at 546–47 (internal citations omitted). The California Supreme Court notably
rejected the idea that liability could attach in the face of the prisoner’s waiver of nutrition
and hydration. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 386–87 (Cal. 1993).
210
Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 601–03.
211
Casey, supra note 5, at 99 (“This is irrelevant. There is no right to choose death over
imprisonment. And there is especially no right to choose a punishment otherwise prohibited
by the Constitution.”).
206
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argument contains no principle limiting lethal injection to death-sentenced
prisoners.
For non-death-sentenced prisoners, courts reject the notion that
hopelessness or a desire to atone for one’s crimes entitled a prisoner to
hasten death. Instead, courts impose a duty on the state to maintain life.
Further, echoing Casey’s argument, courts find that whether and when to
die is simply not for the prisoner to decide. In confronting a prisoner’s
request for expedited execution, courts should weigh the state’s strong
interest in keeping volunteers alive, as it does with other prisoners.
B. INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

The prisoner cases frequently invoke concerns regarding the orderly
administration of the prison.212 In McNabb v. Department of Corrections,
the Washington Supreme Court considered the case of Charles McNabb
who sought to refuse force-feeding by the prison.213 The prison began forcefeeding him after he “had not eaten voluntarily for over five months.”214
The plurality opinion noted that the prisoner was neither “terminally ill” nor
“debilitated by disease”; McNabb wanted only to have his fast “take its
course” to his death.215 While recognizing McNabb had a “limited right to
refuse artificial means of nutrition and hydration,” the court noted that it
was “subject to the goals and policies of the prison system.”216 The prison’s
interest was “an additional state interest that should be considered.”217
Further, courts should defer to prison administrators’ assessments of the
risks to institutional security and order.218 The plurality concluded:
Therefore, the court will weigh McNabb’s right to refuse artificial means of nutrition
and hydration against the existence of five compelling state interests: (1) the
maintenance of security and orderly administration within the prison system, (2) the
preservation of life, (3) the protection of innocent third parties, (4) the prevention of
suicide, and (5) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.219

212

See, e.g., Stouffer v. Reid, 993 A.2d 104 (Md. 2010); Comm’r. of Corr. v. Myers, 399
N.E.2d 452, 458–59 (Mass. 1979); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 96 (N.H. 1984).
213
McNabb v. Dep’t of Corr., 180 P.3d 1257 (Wash. 2008).
214
Id. at 1259.
215
Id. at 1260.
216
Id. at 1264.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 1264–65. Even the justices who concurred only in the judgment found the
prisoner’s right to refuse medical treatment was constrained:
Prisoners who are otherwise healthy have no right to refuse artificial means of nutrition and
hydration in an effort to end their lives. Contrary to the inference of the dissent, Charles McNabb
is not conducting a hunger strike—he is attempting to commit suicide. The extraordinary
intervention in this case was initiated only when medical staff issued a written determination that

2015]

CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS

193

This interest should be weighed in the case of volunteers, as well.
While the data are not clear whether or how prison security may be
disrupted by volunteers, researchers have observed that suicides can occur
in clusters, and can be “contagious” insofar as one suicide may “facilitate
the occurrence of a subsequent suicide.”220 This raises the question whether
one individual’s decision to hasten execution could affect others. Blume
reports that many attorneys believe execution hastening is contagious, and
Blume’s data tentatively suggest that contagion could be a dynamic
affecting decisions to hasten execution.221 If such a dynamic is at work, it
portends a systematic degradation of the legal process, as well as the
possibility of increased depression and hopelessness. This could increase
the burden on prison mental health staff. Courts should therefore inquire
into the impact of a particular volunteer’s execution on the larger death row
population.
C. STATE’S INTEREST IN PROTECTING INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES

The Death with Dignity statutes do not provide a voice for third
parties, and this may well reflect the fact that the weight of this factor has
receded in importance in the passive euthanasia cases.222 It may also reflect
the fact that the Death with Dignity statutes narrow the group of people who
may avail themselves of the law. Individuals must be within six months of
death.
For otherwise healthy people, such as the prisoner in Laurie v.
Senecal, this concern may be more prominent. In the context of the social
ties of death row prisoners, empirical research suggests that volunteers as a
group are not dramatically more socially isolated than those who pursue
their appeals. The existence of “execution impact” evidence, i.e., testimony
from the capital defendant’s loved ones about the negative effect his
execution would have on them at trial also suggests the existence of
McNabb’s health was threatened. McNabb has no right to starve himself to death by refusing
sustenance while in the custody of the State—this is not a privacy right that citizens of the state
hold or expect to hold.

Id. at 1267 (Madsen, J., concurring).
220
Madelyn S. Gould et al., Suicide Clusters: A Critical Review, 19 SUICIDE & LIFETHREATENING BEHAV. 17, 18 (1989); Matthew K. Nock et al., Suicide and Suicidal Behavior,
30 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 133, 145 (2008) (identifying suicidal behavior among peers as a
risk factor for suicide).
221
Blume, supra note 6, at 964. The Texas data suggest that it is difficult to disentangle
contagion from other influences on decisions to be executed. Rountree, supra note 73, at 67–
71.
222
The New Mexico opinion striking down the physician-assisted death ban, by contrast,
repeatedly noted the impact of the death on family members and loved ones. Morris v.
Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV 2012-02909, at 6, 12 (2d Jud. Dist. N.M. Jan. 13, 2014).
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comparable evidence when execution is a more proximate reality.223
Nevertheless, these family ties are disregarded in waiver adjudications. The
voices of mothers, fathers, children, and spouses should be included and
weighed in the court’s adjudication.
D. STATE’S INTEREST IN THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND
LEGAL PROFESSION

The state has multiple interests specific to the operation of the legal
system in capital cases. First, it must ensure the legitimacy of the deathsentencing process. Second, it must create legal structures enable individual
lawyers to act ethically.
1. The Legitimacy of the Death Penalty System
As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, the state has “an interest
in the reliability and integrity of a death sentencing decision.”224 This
concern has led scholars to propose legal standards that protect this interest.
Anthony Casey advocates a standard whereby the state’s interest diminishes
as appeals are pursued and (from the prisoner’s perspective) lost. Casey
bases his argument in part on his contention that the chance of error
diminishes as the case proceeds.225 This in turn increases the state’s
confidence in the reliability and integrity of the death sentence. Evolutions
in the law governing capital appeals undermine the assumption that the
chance of error decreases as appeals progress. Certainly federal judges with

223
See Wayne A. Logan, When Balance and Fairness Collide: An Argument for
Execution Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1 (1999). As Logan
notes, execution impact evidence “permits jurors to recognize in a visceral way that their
capital decision does not occur in a vacuum—that the life they may decide to take perhaps
has had, and perhaps will continue to have, some positive effect on others.” Id. at 52.
224
State v. Martini, 677 A.2d 1106, 1107 (N.J. 1996). In dissenting from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gilmore v. Utah, Justice Marshall expressed this interest more pungently:
“[T]he Eighth Amendment not only protects the right of individuals not to be victims of
cruel and unusual punishment, but that it also expresses a fundamental interest of society in
ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments.” 429 U.S. at
1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225
Casey, supra note 5, at 101, 103.

The interest in restricting defendants from volunteering for execution is derived from the state’s
responsibility to prevent the inconsistent or inappropriate application of the death sentence. . . .
Each stage of the proceedings serves as a safeguard against an inappropriate death sentence and
the danger of such a sentence diminishes as the case proceeds through each stage. . . .
....
Every stage serves as a checkpoint, an additional safeguard filtering out the impurities.

Id. For a contrary view, see, e.g., DAVID R. DOW, EXECUTED
INJUSTICE ON AMERICA’S DEATH ROW 52–86 (2005).

ON A
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life tenure may have a different perspective from elected state judges,226 the
quality of counsel can improve, and new evidence may come to light as the
case proceeds. Given the current direction of federal habeas law, however,
the more defensible justification for the changing balance is the state’s
diminishing interest in ensuring the accuracy of the process. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act227 and the body of habeas corpus
law that has evolved in its wake have narrowed the scope of federal judicial
review, raised the prisoner’s evidentiary burden, and limited the federal
courts’ ability to grant the prisoner relief as compared to state courts and to
pre-AEDPA federal powers.228 These restrictions reflect the current view
that the state’s interest in correcting error decreases as its interest in finality
increases.229
Conversely, the state’s interest is highest in the early stages of the
process, namely at trial.230 Arguments that death-sentenced individuals
simply choose the timing of their punishment, not the punishment itself,231
are undermined by cases in which people facing the death penalty prevented
a full and fair hearing at the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of trial.
In the Texas study, some volunteers asked the jury for the death penalty,
barred presentation of mitigating evidence, halted cross-examination of
hostile witnesses, or required counsel to pick a pro-death-penalty jury.232 In
226

Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas
Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional
Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1826–32 (2000).
227
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
228
See generally Larry Yackle, AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 FED. SENT. RPTR. 328, 331–33
(2012) (describing ways in which AEDPA changed federal habeas law).
229
See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011) (finding interest in finality
weighs against introduction of new evidence in federal habeas proceedings); Samuel R.
Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 1006 (2012) (observing that
“federalism, comity, and finality rival, if not eclipse, the vindication of constitutional rights
as the primary concern of federal habeas”).
230
Casey, supra note 5, at 104–05.
231
See, e.g., Milner, supra note 7, at 296.
232
These techniques were variously used by Texas volunteers Joe Fedelfido Gonzales,
Steven Renfro, Christopher Jay Swift, Richard Beavers, and James Scott Porter. Joe
Fedelfido Gonzales pro se Appellant’s Brief in CCA No. 72,253, filed in the TCCA on June
27, 1996 (at 2 (“During the individual voir dire, I, Joe F. Gonzales, Jr. made statements
which were true and correct so that I would systematically stack the deck against myself, so I
would more or less be convicted of the charge, (capital murder), and by not cross examining
the state’s witnesses nor objecting to direct examination or to the admittance of evidence,
(by my own judgment and free will), I believe was an asset to the state and an aid to the
jurors in their answering the special issue questions number one (1) and number two (2) so
that the death penalty would ultimately be imposed.”); opening argument at 23 (reassuring
jury that request for death penalty not suicidal); Steven Renfro: District Court No. 960102Xl, Reporter’s Record (RR) 25:3152–54 (Renfro instructed counsel not to cross-
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addition, these arguments ignore the possibility of error by the trial court.
Prisoners should not be allowed to waive direct appeal, the stage at which
the trial court’s decisions are reviewed.
Nor should courts permit prisoners to waive review of possibly
unconstitutional sentences. “[T]he consent of a convicted defendant in a
criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”233 Claims that the would-be
volunteer should be excluded from the death penalty by virtue of, e.g., his
intellectual disability or youth at the time of the crime, should be decided
before the validity of the waiver is adjudicated.234 Finally, in light of
evidence regarding botched executions,235 litigation regarding the procedure
used to kill should also not be waivable. There is a “strong societal interest
in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments that should not be waived by
one individual,” as such a waiver would essentially “deprive the Eighth
Amendment of meaning.”236 Therefore, under the regime this Article
proposes, prisoners’ burden to demonstrate an entitlement to expedited
execution would decrease as appeals progressed. However, regardless of the
stage of appeals, the prisoner could not waive appeals regarding the method
of execution or whether the prisoner falls within a category of offenders
excluded from execution.
2. The Integrity of the Legal Profession
Physicians’ conflicts with hastening death have sometimes been
reconciled by reference to the importance of recognizing the importance of
autonomy in a therapeutic relationship.237 The more profound question
examine witness); RR 28:3664 (Renfro tells jury his crime deserved the death penalty);
Christopher Swift, District Court No. F-2003-1720-C, RR 35:33–34 (confirming on the
record he does not want any mitigating evidence presented at punishment phase); Richard
Beavers, District Ct No. 465138, RR 21: 269–71 (Beavers waives right to cross-examine
surviving victim); James Scott Porter, District Court No. 00-F-0441-202, RR 5:29-30 (Porter
limited defense counsel’s ability to present certain defenses, to contact mitigation witnesses,
and to present any witnesses on his behalf).
233
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
234
See also Blume, supra note 6, at 977–78.
235
See, e.g., Katie Fretland, Clayton Lockett Writhed and Groaned. After 43 Minutes, He
Was Declared Dead, GUARDIAN (April 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
apr/30/clayton-lockett-oklahoma-execution-witness, archived at http://perma.cc/LGF7F2KT; Michael Kiefer, Arizona Officials Deny Execution Was Botched, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(July 25, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2014/07/25/arizonaofficials-deny-execution-botched/13145329/, archived at http://perma.cc/W577-FPA9.
236
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by
Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 642 (2000).
237
See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
426–27 (1977).
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physicians have raised is whether their role in hastening death transforms
the image of the profession or even changes the profession itself.238 Critics
of assisted death voice concern that doctors may become more engaged
with helping patients die than with alleviating their pain or addressing their
depression.239
Similar questions are worth asking in the context of legal
representation. What aspects of the attorney’s role or the attorney–client
relationship may be enhanced or degraded by enabling a client’s death?
Some may fear that an attorney’s refusal to follow his client’s order to
hasten his execution undermines a core professional value. Others may
believe that by asserting the importance of pursuing appeals, they uphold a
system that metes out punishment in a lawful, orderly way. They also fulfill
another mission—to show their clients that their lives have value and that
they are entitled to the protections of due process.
A larger concern is that a lawyer’s experience of helping a client die
could change future approaches to representation by that individual attorney
or within that legal community. The experience could, e.g., erode the
attorney’s or the profession’s commitment to enhancing the reliability and
integrity of the capital conviction and death sentence through a thorough
investigation.
When confronted with a volunteer, the court should examine whether
counsel has performed the investigation outlined by the American Bar
Association’s Guidelines.240 While not limited to these questions, the
investigation is particularly important as it pertains to issues directly related
to the appropriateness of the death sentence, i.e., whether the prisoner is
excluded from the death penalty because of his juvenile status at the time of
the crime or his intellectual disability, and whether he is “innocent of the
death penalty,” i.e., his crime did not constitute capital murder. Where the
proportionality of the sentence is legally relevant, the investigation must
238

See, e.g., HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 130, at 37, 45, 90–91, 129–30, 139.
Id. at 181–82 (American Medical Association President expressing concern that
physician-assisted death “would . . . discourage the kind of appropriate aggressive palliative
care that can dissuade patients in pain from seeking just such an early death. Recent
promising developments . . . could be set back dramatically”). Author and physician Atul
Gawande recently described the planned assisted death of a woman with terminal brain
cancer as “a sign that our health care system has failed her, because she cannot trust that
medical personnel are going to recognize her priority of not suffering and be willing to offer
sufficient care and therapy.” FRONTLINE, Brittany Maynard: Symbol of a Broken Health
Care System? | FRONTLINE, YOUTUBE (Oct. 17, 2014), http://youtu.be/nIvZtd1nEzE?
t=1m41s, archived at http://perma.cc/A7GW-22Z7. These physicians fear that not only have
individual doctors possibly failed their patients by not meeting their needs, but that the
profession as a whole may fail to commit to making good palliative care a priority.
240
American Bar Association, supra note 107, at 1015–27.
239
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also be adequate to provide courts with the evidence required to perform
their statutory duty.241 This inquiry would be analogous to asking a
physician whether she had performed the tests necessary to reach an
accurate diagnosis of the patient’s condition.
3. Counsel Must Be Appointed to Represent the Range of State Interests
Judicial inquiry into counsel’s investigation is essential, but the
professional tension volunteers’ lawyers experience would be substantially
resolved by appointing counsel to represent the prisoner and different
counsel to argue for the state’s interests in rejecting the prisoner’s waiver.
Certainly the lackluster litigation in the Texas volunteer cases suggests such
appointment of counsel is essential.242 In a few volunteer cases, courts have
appointed counsel (or asserted counsel should have been appointed) to
present the case for the incompetence or involuntariness of the waiver.243
When capital defendants have refused to permit the presentation of
mitigating evidence, some courts have allowed or required other
participants to provide mitigating evidence.244 A similar mechanism should
be used in presenting the case for the state’s interests in the broader inquiry

241

See cases cited supra note 13 (outlining scope of mandatory review).
Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 609–12.
243
Mason ex rel. Marson v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the
district court had ordered counsel to remain prisoner’s court-appointed attorney until his
mental competence was determined); Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019–20 (D.
Ariz. 2002) (noting that the court had ordered habeas counsel to present evidence that
prisoner’s waiver was incompetent and involuntary, and that it had appointed separate
counsel to represent prisoner in his effort to waive his appeals); State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131,
141–42 (Conn. 2005) (appointing counsel to present case against prisoner’s waiver, but
emphasizing unique aspects of case); accord. Tabler v. Stephens, 588 Fed. App’x 297, 311
(5th Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[I]t was ineffective assistance of counsel for them
to allow Tabler to waive his habeas rights without taking action to test his competency.”),
vacated, No. 12-70013, 2015 WL 327646, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015); Appel v. Horn, 250
F.3d 203, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Appel’s counsel should have investigated, advocated, or
otherwise acted to ensure that there was ‘meaningful adversarial testing [of Appel’s
competency].’”) (internal citations omitted)); O’Rourke v. Endell, 153 F.3d 560, 569 (8th
Cir. 1998) (“We believe O’Rourke should have been represented by an attorney, either a
counsel of record or a ‘next friend,’ to argue that he lacked the capacity to waive his
appeal.”); Newman v. Norris, No. 05-2107, 2008 WL 222689 at *8 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 24,
2008) (“The position that Petitioner was not competent to waive his rights to counsel and to
seek post-conviction relief should have been advanced by an attorney, either a counsel of
record or a ‘next friend.’”).
244
See Barnes v. State, 29 So.3d 1010, 1022–26 (Fla. 2010) (upholding appointment of
“mitigation counsel” to assist court where defendant refused to present mitigation evidence);
Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 523–24 (Fla. 2005) (court required State to present
parole officer).
242

2015]

CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS

199

proposed here.245 By ensuring that the state’s interests are adequately
litigated, appointed counsel would also alleviate the conflict counsel must
struggle with in representing a client who seeks execution.

E. STANDARD OF PROOF

Once the court has considered the evidence and argument regarding
the state’s interest in preventing suicide, protecting the interests of innocent
third parties, the reliability and constitutionality of the death sentence and
execution, and the impact of the execution on other prisoners and prison
staff, it must determine whether the prisoner has demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that his right to die outweighs the state’s interests. As
the Supreme Court noted:
[T]his Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—clear and convincing
evidence—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both
particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of money . . . .
We think it self-evident that the interests at stake in the instant proceedings are more
substantial, both on an individual and societal level, than those involved in a run-ofthe-mill civil dispute. But not only does the standard of proof reflect the importance of
a particular adjudication, it also serves as a societal judgment about how the risk of
error should be distributed between the litigants. The more stringent the burden of
proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision. . .
. An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo; the
possibility of subsequent developments . . . at least create the potential that a wrong
decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction.246

Here too, of course, a life is at stake, and not simply pecuniary
interests. In addition, the legitimacy of the death penalty system as a
whole—our interest “in making sure that the government does not act
brutally and lawlessly”247—rests on this determination as well. If the court
finds the prisoner has met his burden to claim a right to assisted death, it
must then determine—again with the aid of appointed counsel and an
adversarial process—whether the prisoner has established his waiver of
appeals is both competent and voluntary.248
245
Strafer, supra note 4, at 908–11, suggests some of the interests I outline here could be
safeguarded by permitting greater involvement of third parties. Recognizing the difficulties
many family members experience in understanding the legal system and gaining access to
counsel, as well as the State’s role in protecting their interests, I would shift the burden to the
State to ensure its interests are presented to the court.
246
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (internal punctuation
and citations omitted). Id. at 283 (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
247
Althouse, supra note 96, at 1191.
248
State and federal jurisdictions vary with respect to the burden of proof courts should
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CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia, rarely a friend to the death row prisoner, quoted from a
nineteenth century court opinion in objecting to arguments for a
fundamental right to die:
The life of those to whom life has become a burden—of those who are hopelessly
diseased or fatally wounded—nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to death,
are under the protection of the law, equally as the lives of those who are in the full
tide of life’s enjoyment, and anxious to continue to live.249

In fact, the law does distinguish the “hopelessly diseased” from the
condemned. Some non-terminal individuals with a higher risk for suicide
are allowed to obtain the state’s assistance in dying, regardless of the
interests of third parties, systemic questions about the legitimacy of the
legal system and legal profession, and the broader state interest in
protecting life and preventing suicide, even of death row prisoners. The
invisibility of this disparity in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is
striking. In Glucksberg, for example, Justice Souter and Justice O’Connor
asked almost existential questions about how we can know whether a
decision to die is truly competent, knowing, and voluntary.250 In the
criminal justice system, these assessments regarding voluntariness and
competence, far from being too uncertain to hazard, are made routinely.
Courts assess voluntariness in every plea agreement, and adjudicate the
competency of tens of thousands of men and women every year.251 In the
context of the criminal justice system, the fact that the proceedings involve
desires to hasten death does not alter the calculability of competence.
The Court is concerned about suicidality and desires to die in one
setting, but indifferent in another. The Court in Glucksberg was particularly
concerned by the problem of accurately diagnosing and treating depression,
and cited empirical data linking depression, mental disorders and desires to
hasten death.252 The Supreme Court’s sensitivity to suicide in this context

apply in waiver adjudications. See, e.g., Mason ex rel. Marson v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220,
1225 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring federal court to find competence by the preponderance of the
evidence); State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 146 (Conn. 2005) (because trial court’s
determination based on a preponderance of the evidence standard not clearly erroneous,
court declined to decide who bore the burden of proof); Reid ex rel. Martiniano v. State, 396
S.W.3d 478, 516 (Tenn. 2013) (requiring prisoner to demonstrate incompetence by clear and
convincing evidence).
249
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
250
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 738 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id.
at 783–84 (Souter, J., concurring).
251
Maroney, supra note 138, at 1378.
252
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730–31.
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contrasts sharply with its death row cases where suicidality and depression
featured plainly.253
The Court in Glucksberg was also aware of the problems of social
marginalization and desires to hasten death. It expressed concern that
legalizing assisted suicide would expose “vulnerable groups–including the
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons” to “abuse, neglect, and
mistakes.”254 It is difficult to imagine, however, a more profoundly
stigmatized social group than death-sentenced prisoners.255 The concerns
the Court identifies regarding compromised autonomy and lack of access to
good medical care apply with full force to prisoners. Underscoring the
different treatment of prisoners, however, the circuit court in Rumbaugh
cited the poor mental health care in prison as a reason to permit Rumbaugh
to waive his appeals: “[Rumbaugh’s] ability to make the life/death choice is
apparent from his comments . . . that if he thought that meaningful
treatment were available and if it were offered, he would probably change
his decision not to appeal.”256
Gary Gilmore left an unmistakable imprint on the right to hasten death
accorded death row prisoners, but the continuing power of his example
reflects that the law of volunteers is dominated by the capital punishment
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Only Justice Marshall made any reference to Gilmore’s suicide attempt. Gilmore v.
Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Godinez v. Moran, the
majority recited a series of violent acts Moran committed, some against others, and then
against himself. 509 U.S. 389, 394 n. 3 (1993). The majority made no reference to
depression and literally marginalized Moran’s suicidality by relegating it to a footnote that
recites the lower court’s reasons for rejecting Moran’s waiver. Id. The dissent discusses
Moran’s depression and suicidality, and complains that in the majority opinion, “the most
significant facts are omitted or relegated to footnotes.” Id. at 409, 410, 416–17 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). In Demosthenes v. Baal, the Court mentions the prisoner’s suicide attempts
only in the context of explaining the evidence before the lower court. 495 U.S. 731, 735–37
(1990). The dissenting opinion once again offers a larger context for understanding the
prisoner’s actions. Here the dissenting Justices reveal that Baal

has been hospitalized for behavioral and mental problems on numerous occasions since he was
fourteen years old, has attempted suicide on at least four occasions since 1987 [including twice
in April 1990], and has been diagnosed in the past as a latent schizophrenic, a borderline
personality, depressed, and as suffering from organic brain syndrome.

Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
254
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
255
While the stigma associated with their crime and punishment may be a useful form of
social control and expression of social norms, it is also relevant that death-sentenced
prisoners tend to be drawn from marginalized groups. Justice Douglas noted in Furman v.
Georgia: “Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has said, ‘It is the poor, the sick, the
ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed.’ One searches our chronicles in vain
for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of this society.” 408 U.S. 238, 251–52
(1972).
256
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 402 (1985).
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frame. By not only involving criminal cases, which implicate normative
ideas of who commits crimes and why, but also the death penalty, with its
own logics and history, volunteers have developed a right to die
substantially removed from the wider social and legal debates over
hastening death. Where this wider discussion has defined the problem as the
hypermedicalized, debilitating, and painful “bad” death, it has also had to
contend with powerful social anxieties. The negative history of euthanasia,
our concern for marginalized, suicidal, and/or vulnerable individuals, and
fears of a slippery slope that may transform a right to die into a duty to die
also inform the legal questions courts ask.
By making legally irrelevant the prisoner’s depression, his
relationships with loved ones, and the experience of advocating for the
death of one’s client, the volunteer jurisprudence further marginalizes the
condemned prisoner. This marginalization, paradoxically through a more
expansive right, undermines the legitimacy of the legal system generally. In
addition, as the empirical evidence also makes clear, it also specifically
threatens the legitimacy of the death penalty by permitting prisoners to
hasten execution by bypassing adversarial proceedings. To right this
balance—indeed, to inject a balance—into the legal treatment of volunteers,
the legal standard for adjudicating death row prisoners’ requests to hasten
execution should recognize and weigh the full panoply of the state’s
interests.

